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I.
THE NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF ESTATE PLANNING
STATE planmng in the broad sense is an individual's planning
for the acquisition, conservation, use and distribution of his
property In the more restricted sense of the phrase with which
we are here concerned, estate planning is an individual's planning for
* Horowitz, Charles; AB., University of Washington, 1925; L.L.B., University
of Washington, 1927; B.A. in Jurisprudence at Oxford, England, 1929; Lecturer
of Law, University of Washington, 1932-1933, 1939, 1945; member of the law firm
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the most beneficial transfer and transmission of property to estate
beneficiaries integrated with planning against unnecessary estate
shrinkage. Such planning involves provision for efficient and prudent
management, provision for estate liquidity sufficient to prevent unnec-
cessary sacrifice of estate assets, provision for minimizing the costs of
administration and management, and provision for minimizing income,
gift, inheritance and estate taxation.'
II.
MARITAL PROPERTY
The nature of marital property interests is a question of state law 2
It is that law to which one must turn to determine the characteristics
of property with which one deals in estate planning. Nevertheless,
federal law-primarily because of federal tax law-must be considered
so that planning in the field of marital property may not prove costly
taxwlse.
It is not enough, however, to be familiar with the marital property
law of a particular state in which an estate plan is being worked out.
It is occasionally necessary to be familiar with marital property law
of other state or states in which marital property of the individual may
be located or which after being derived therefrom has been transferred
to the state of residence or domicile of the individual concerned. In
addition, it is necessary to have a knowledge of the marital property
law as it is affected by the doctrines of the Conflict of Laws.
IIt is the purpose of this paper to outline the principal factors to be considered
by a practitioner in estate planning in Washington with such reference to
detailed problems as may be necessary. For a full discussion of detailed prob-
lems, recourse will have to be had to additional sources. There is a growing
legal literature on the subject. See inter alia: Cleary, Protecting the Famiy/
Through Estate Planning (June, 1947) 25 TAXEs-TaE TAX MAGAZINE 543; Shepherd
and Pruyn, Some Federal Tax Aspects of Will Draftsmanship (May, 1947) 25
TAXEs-THE TAX MAGAZINE 433; Mandell, A Tax Guide for Estate Planning (May,
1947) 25 TAXEs-TH TAX MAGAZINE 418; Mayo A. Shattuck, The Creation of Estate
Plans (December, 1946 et seq.) THE JouRNAL or THE AmumCAN SocTy OF C. L. U.,
Baxter, Some Aspects of Planning (November, 1946) 24 TAxzs-THE TAX MAG-
AZINE 1077; Polisher, Estate Planning: A New Legal Science (1946) 50 DicK. L. REV.,
Foosaner, The Tax Technique in the Preparation of Wills and Trusts (June,
1946) 24 TAXEs-THE TAx MAGAZINE 562; Powers, Objectives of Estate Planning,
(May, 1946) 82 TRUSTS & ESTATES MAGAZINE; Morehead, How to Minimize Estate
Taxes in Drafting Wills (Dec., 1945) 23 TAXEs--THm TAX MAGAZINE 1144; Laiken,
Estate Planning (Oct, 1945) 23 TAXs-THE TAX MAGAZINE 866; Laiken, Planning
Your Estate (July, 1945) 81 TRUSTS & ESTATES MAGAZINE 29.
Legal fees incurred in estate planning have been held deductible for income
tax purposes under INT. Rwv. Co § 23 (a) (2) Bagley v. C. I. R., 8 T. C. No. 24.
2 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) c. 7; U. S. CoNsT. A-vEND. X.
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Although systems of marital property in the United States vary from
state to state, two principal systems exist, namely, the common law
system (in very much modified form, however), and the community
property system. Let us briefly consider the common law system on
which is based the -great majority of marital property systems in this
country
A. THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM
At common law, marriage was a much more serious matter from the
standpoint of legal consequences than it is today I By marriage, the
wife's legal personality for many purposes merged with that of her
husband.' He became entitled to the society of Ins wife, her services
and her obedience.' He became the owner of her personal property,
whether acquired before or after marriage, of which she had actual or
legal posesssion, such as money or chattels,' and, on reducing them to
his possession, he acquired her choses in action and limited interests
in personalty7 In addition, he acquired the right to the possession,
use, income and usufruct of her freehold real estate,' whether owned
by his wife before marriage or acquired thereafter.9 In addition,,
during marriage he obtained a life estate as tenant by curtesy initiate
in the real property of which his wife was seized of an estate of inheri-
tance during marriage if a child had been born of the marriage alive
and capable of inheriting.10 This estate by the curtesy initiate which
3 Only the broad outlines of the common law marital property system, with
appropriate illustrations, and as affected by equity and statute are here at-
tempted.
' Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 54 L. ed. 1180, 31 Sup. Ct. 111, 30 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1153, 21 ANN. CAs. 921 (1911)
5 Ex parte Alabama Textile Products Corp., 242 Ala. 609, 7 So. (2d) 303, 141
A. L. R. 87 (1942); Root v. Root, 164 Mich. 194, 130 N. W 194, 82 L. R. A. (N. s.)
837, A N. CAS. (1912 B) 740 (1911); Brewer v. Brewer, 79 Neb. 726, 113 N. W 161,
13 L. R. A. (N. s.) 222 (1907) The husband is head of the family. Hagert v.
Hagert, 22 N. D. 290, 133 N. W 1035, 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 966, ANN, CAS. (1914 B) 925
(1911)
a McAnally v. Alabama Insane Hospital, 109 Ali. 109, 19 So. 492, 34 L. R. A.
228, 55 Am. St. Rep. 923 (1896); Burleigh v. Coffin, 22 N. H. 118, 53 Am. Dec. 236
(1850); Bank of America v. Banks, 101 U. S. 240 (1879)
7 rice v. Sessions, 3 How. 624 (U. S. 1895), Hyde v. Stone, 9 Cow. 230 (N. Y.
1828), 18 Am. Dec. 501; Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Hume, 121 Ala. 168, 24
So. 806, '77 Am. St. Rep. 43 (1899)
8 Edrmgton v. Harper, 3 J. J. Marsh, 353 (Ky. 1830), 20 Am. Dec. 145; Bank of
America v. Banks, 101 U. S. 240 (1879); Bishop v. Reedsboro Chair Mfg. Co., 85
Vt. 141, 81 AtL 454, 36 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1171, ANN. CAS. (1914 B) 1163 (1911)
0 McNeer v. McNeer, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N. E. 681, 19 L. R. A. 256 (1892)
20 Breeding v. Davis, 77 Va. 639, 46 Am. Rep. 740 (1883); Burgess v. Muldoon,
18 R. I. 607, 29 AtI. 298, 24 L. R. A. 798 (1894); Wells v. Thompson, 13 Ala. 793, 48
Am. Dec. 76 (1848)
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the husband acquired during the lifetime of his wife became an estate
by the curtesy consummate upon her death during his lifetime.1 These
property rights were the husband's, available if necessary to satisfy
the claims of his creditors. 2
The unity of personalty had other effects. The wife's power to
contract, which as an adult Jeme sole she fully enjoyed at common
law," was for most purposes suspended by marriage."4 A wife could
not sell, contract to sell, transfer, give away, lease, or otherwise deal
with or dispose of her real and personal property, whether owned prior
to marriage or acquired thereafter. Nor could such disabilities be
removed through the operation of the doctrines of estoppel."6 Any
ante-nuptial indebtedness of either spouse to the other was extin-
guished.' The husband became liable for his wife's ante-nuptial
debts." Even ante-nuptial settlement agreements defining post-nuptial
property rights of the spouses were extinguished by marriage" The
husband became entitled to his wife's services, labor, profits and earn-
ings'-so much so that in a suit by the husband for wages payable for
21 See 82 Am. St. Rep. 885; 103 Am. St. Rep. 590; 112 Am. St. Rep. 572; 128 Am.
St. Rep. 481.
12 Ocklawaha River Farms Co. v. Young, 73 Fla. 159, 74 So. 644, L. R. A. 1917F
337 (1917), Hanlon v. Thayer, Quincy 99 (Mass. 1765), 1 Am. Dec. 1; annotation:
133 A. L. R. 637 (1941)
18 Sex, as such, is not a disqualifying factor at common law if legal capacity
otherwise exists. As to her separate estate, however, the wife's power to contract
is substantially the same as if she were "feme sole," Chew v. Henretta Mining &
Smelting Co., 2 Fed. 5, 8 (1880)
" Ankeny v. Hannon, 147 U. S. 118, 37 L. ed. 105, 13 Sup. Ct. 206 (1893), annota-
tion: 24 L. R. A. 635, 28 L. R. A. (N. s.) 873, 34 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1080. Upon termina-
tion of marriage, e.g., by death of husband, the disabilities of coverture are
removed. Singleton v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 191 S. E. 478, 55 Ga. App.
776 (1937)
1 Annotation: 4 Am. CAS. 586, 587; L. R. A. 1915C 768; Warren v. Wagner,
75 Ala. 188, 51 Am. St. Rep. 446 (1883), Taylor v. Swafford, 122 Tenn. 303, 123 S. W
350, 25 L. R. A. (N. s) 442 (1909), Agricultural Bank of Miss. v. Rice, 4 How.
(U. S.) 225 (1846)
26 Artmen v. Ferguson, 73 Mich. 146, 40 N. W 907, 2 L. R. A. 343, 16 Am. St.
Rep. 572 (1888), Powell v. Bowen, 279 Mo. 280, 214 S. W 142 (1919)
7 Deshon v. Wood, 148 Mass. 132, 19 N. E. 1, 1 L. R. A. 518 (1888), Brown v.
Slater, 16 Conn. 192, 41 Am. Dec. 136 (1844)
28 First Wisconsin National Bank v. Milwaukee Patent Leather Co., 179 Wis.
117, 190 N. W 822, 26 A. L. R. 849 (1922), annotation: 87 A. L. R. 212; 7 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1049; ANN. CAS. (1915 C) 857, 860.
19 Brown v. Slater, 16 Conn. 192, 41 Am. Dec. 136 (1844), Sullings v. Richmond,
5 Allen 187 (Mass. 1862), 81 Am. Dec. 742.
20 Standen v. Penn. R. Co., 214 Pa. 189, 63 Atl. 467, 6 AN. CAs. 408 (1906),
Jackson v. Jackson, 91 U. S. 122 (1875); Belford v. Crane, 16 N. J. Eq. 265, 84
Am. Dec. 155 (1863)
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the wife's services, payment to the wife was no defense.2 Neither
husband nor wife could sue one another. 2 The husband was liable for
his wife's torts (not mixed with elements of contract) before or during
marriage,28 although the wife was not liable for her husband's torts."
Neither spouse could act as agent for one another, 2 and hence they
could not be partners." A husband could not directly convey, transfer,
or give property to his wife, nor in general enter into a contract with
her.2
It must not be thought, however, that the.wife in our early law
was utterly devoid of legal personality She was entitled to be main-
tamed and supported by her husband.8 If he was derelict in his duty
to support her, she could pledge his credit for necessaries. 9 She had
the capacity to take real and personal property by grant, gift, or other-
wise, from any person other than her husband.80 She could dissolve
the marriage for cause.8 She was liable with her husband for her torts
simpliciter;1 2 she had the capacity to commit crimes"' although there
was a presumption that if committed in her husband's presence, she
11 L. R. A. 1917E 283.
22 Heacock v. Heacock, 108 Iowa 540, 79 N. W 353, 75 Am. St. Rep. 273 (1899),
Rams v. Rams, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P (2d) 740 (1935)
28 Gill v. State, 39 W Va. 479, 20 $. E. 568, 26 L. R. A. 655, 45 Am. St Rep. 928
(1894), Woif v. Keagy, 33 Del. 362, 138 Atl. 520 (1927), Hageman v. Vanderdoes,
15 Ariz. 312, 138 Pac. 1053, L. R. A. 1915A 491, AxN. CAS. (1915 D) 1197 (1914),
Green v. Miller, 102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532 (1931)
2
'Multer v. Knibbs, 193 Mass. 536, 79 N. E. 762, 9 L. R. A. (N. s.) 322, 9 ANN.
CAS. 958 (1907); annotation: 12 A. L. R. 1459.
25 Powers v. Southgate, 15 Vt. 471, 40 Am. Dec. 691 (1843); Weisbrod v. Chicago
& N. W R. Co., 18 Wis. 35, 86 Am. Dec. 743 (1864)
25 Board of Trade v. Haydon, 4 Wash. 263, 30 Pac. 87, 32 Pac. 224, 16 L. R. A.
530, 31 Am. St. Rep. 919 (1892) Nor can wife be partner with anyone else. Nadel
v. Weber Bros. Shoe Co., 70 Fla. 218, 70 So. 20, L. R. A. 1916D 1230 (1915)
2 7 Wallingford v. Allen, 10 Pet. 583 (U. S. 1836); Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225
(1879); Kitchen v. Bedford, 13 Wall. 413 (U. S. 1871); Brown v. Brown, 174 Mass.
197, 54 N. E. 532, 75 Am. St. Rep. 292 (1899)
28 Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168 N. E. 169, 66 A. L. R. 1186 (1929)
2 Carr v. Anderson, 154 inn. 162, 191 N. W 407, 26 A. L. R. 557 (1923); Durn-
ford v. Baker (1924) 2 K. B. (Eng.) 587, 14 B. R. C. 515 C. A.
30 Bedford v. Burton, 106 U. S. 338,' 27 L. ed. 112, 1 Sup. Ct. 98 (1882), Fisk v.
Cushman, 6 Cush. 20 (Mass. 1850), 52 Am. Dec. 761; Cushman v. Henry, 75 N. Y.
103, 31 Am. St. Rep. 437 (1878), Bortz v. Bortz, 48 Pa. 382, 86 Am. Dec. 603 (1864)
1 1 Usen v. Usen, 136 Me. 480, 13 A. (2d) 738, 128 A. L. R. 1449 (1940)
8 Edwards v. Porter (1923) 2 K. B. (Eng.) 538, 12 B. R. C. 320-C. A., Keen v.
Hartman, 48 Pa. 497, 86 Am. Dec. 606, 88 Am. Dec. 472 (1864); Graham v. Tucker,
56 Fla. 307, 47 So. 563, 19 L. R. A. (N. s.) 531, 131 Am. St. Rep. 124 (1908), annota-
tion: 27 A. L. R. 1219; 59 A. L. R. 1473; 12 B. R. C. 346; Woodward v. Barnes, 46
*Vt. 332, 14 Am. Rep. 626 (1873)
83 Annotation: 4 A. L. R. 267-269; 71 A. L. R. 1117; 19 L. R. A. 359; 33 Am. St.
Rep. 93; 106 Am. St. Rep. 726.
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was acting under coercion and, therefore, not responsible"' (with cer-
tam exceptions such as murder and treason) 85 She could be a tenant
m an estate by entireties, s.e., an estate created by conveyance or devise
to husband and wife, the wife thereby acquiring a right'of survivorship
upon her husband's death."8 She could also be a joint tenant or tenant
in common with her husband when such tenure arose otherwise than
by conveyance or devise to them during marriage, e.g., continuing
such pre-existing tenancy after marriage."' Upon her husband's death,
she had the right to her paraphernalia except as against her husband's
creditors. 8 She also had the right to dower, %.e., a life estate in one-
third of any land in which the husband in his lifetime had been bene-
ficially seized of an estate of inheritance."9
The law did not, however, rest content with such a primitive system
of marital property The lead in emancipating married women from
the disabilities of coverture and the consequences of the theory of
merger of personality by marriage was taken by courts of equity 10
It began to be established that if property was given to a married
woman with the intention that it should be her sole and separate
property, such intention would be enforced by courts of equity " With
respect to such separate estate or property, the wife was substantially
8, State v. Buchanan, ill W Va. 142, 160 S. E. 920 (1931), C. I. R. v. Neal, 10
Mass. 152 (1813) There is a similar presumption as to torts. Wolf v. Keagy, 33
Del. 362, 136 Ati. 520 (1927)
31 Bibb v. State, 94 Ala. 31, 10 So. 506, 33 Am. St. Rep. 88 (1892), Connor v.
State, 95 Fla. 765, 117 So. 852 (1928), annotation: 4 A. L. R. 277; 71 A. L. R. 1122.
86 Lang v. C. I. R., 289 U. S. 109, 77 L. ed. 1066, 53 Sup. Ct. 534 (1933), Brene-
man v. Corrigan, 4 F (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925)
87 Baker v Stewart, 40 Kan. 442, 19 Pac. 904, 2 L. R. A. 434, 10 Am. St. Rep.
213 (1888)
"8 Masson-Templier v. De Fries (1909) 2 K. B. (Eng.) 831, 4 B. R. C. 601-C. A.,
Rawson v. Penn. R. Co., 48 N. Y. 212, 8 Am. St. Rep. 543 (1872) At common law a
married woman has no right in the personal property of her husband, although
part of the intestate personal estate of the husband is distributed at common law
and under the English Statute of Distribution to the wife. Zakroczymski v.
Zakroczymski, 303 Ill. 264, 135 N. E. 398 (1922); 16 Am. JuR. 772 § 8.
89 Mayburry v. Brien, 15 Pet. 21 (U. S. 1841), Mathews v. Marsden, 71 Mont.
502, 230 Pac. 775 (1924), annotation: 27 L. R. A. 340; 39 Am. St. Rep. 25; 22 Am.
Dec. 710. The wife's dower, unlike the husband's curtesy, is not dependent on
the birth of issue. Sheffield v. Cooke, 39 R. I. 217, 98 Atl. 161, ANN. CAS, (1918 E)
961 (1916), annotation: 112 Am. St. Rep. 577.
,o Ex parte Badger, 286 No. 139, 226 S. W 936, 14 A. L. R. 286 (1920), Tullett
v. Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1, 48 Eng. Reprint 371, 4 Myl. & C. 390, 41 Eng. Reprint
152, 3 Eng. Rul. Cas. 214 (1838), annotation: 10 Am. St. Rep. 288, 3 Eng. Rul.
Cas. 236.
" Butler v. Buckingham, 5 Day 492 (Conn. 1813), 5 Am. Dec. 174; Barnum v.
Le Master, 110 Tenn. 638, 75 S. W 1045, 69 L. R. A. 353 (1903)
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emancipated from the disabilities of coverture so far as the terms of
the trust permitted.' This was true regardless of the husband's con-
sent'8 or any ante-nuptial agreement." Such separate estate could be
settled by conveyance, devise or bequest to the wife before or after
marriage." It could exist with respect to real or personal property '"
It could come about by ante-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement.', It
could arise from a deed from the husband to the wife, or from gifts by
him to her during coverture," or from third persons to her" or by the
woman herself."0
With respect to such separate estate, where the instrument conferred
the necessary power, a married woman could m equity appoint, alien-
ate, encumber, sell and devise the same."1 In some jurisdictions she
could enter into certain contracts with her husband such as partner-
ship. 2 She could convey, transfer, encumber, mortgage and assign
property to her husband."8 A court of equity recogmzed the right of a
wife to her separate earmngs if her husband deserted her or settled
them on her.' In equity, a wife's separate estate was not subject to
"King v. Rhew, 108 N. C. 696, 13 S. E. 174, 23 Am. St. Rep. 76 (1891); Jamison
v. Brady, 6 Serg. & R. 466 (Penn. 1821), 9 Am. Dec. 460.
"Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91, 90 Am. Dec. 225 (1865)
"hotcL At common law, antenuptial marriage settlement is extinguished by
marriage. Schilling v. Darmody, 102 Tenn. 439, 52 S. W. 291, 73 Am. St. Rep. 892
(1899); Rieger v. Schaible, 81 Neb. 33, 115 N. W. 560, 116 N. W. 953, 17 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 866 (1908)
," Ankeny v. Hannon, 147 U. S. 118, 37 L. ed. 105, 13 Sup. Ct. 206 (1892);
Roberts v. Stevens, 84 Me. 325, 24 Ati. 873, 17 L. R. A. 266 (1892)
"Lee v. Mathews, 10 Ala. 682, 44 Am. Dec. 498 (1846); Robinson v. Dart, 13
Sup. Ct. Eq. (Deed) 128 (1838), 31 Am. Dec. 569; Dor ex dem. Basom v. Holt, 47
N. C. 323, 64 Am. Dec. 585 (1855); Price v. Planters Natl. Bank, 92 Va. 468, 23
S. B. 887 (1896)
47 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869), 1 L. R. A. 518; 2 L. R. A. 373; 17
L. R. A. (N. s.) 866; 26 L. R. A. (N. s.) 858; 24 Eng. Rul. Cas. 184.
,8 Mews v. Mews, 15 Beav. 529 (Eng. 1852), 51 Reprint 643; Ashworth v. Ontran,
5 Ch. D. 923 (Eng. 1877); Loons v. Brush, 36 Mich. 40 (1877)
"0 Zn re Benton, 19 Ch. D. 277 (Eng. 1882), Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atk.
393, 26 Reprint 1026 (Eng. 1746)
50 Dean v. Brown, 5 B & C 336, 11 E. C. L. 487, 108 Reprint 125, 2 C & P 62,
12 E. C. L. 451 (1828); Cardwell v. Perry, 82 Ky. 129 (1884).
5 1 Tiernan v. Poor, 1 Gill & J. 216 (Md. 1829), 19 Am. Dec. 225; Ladd v. Ladd,
8 How. 10 (U. S. 1849); Osgood v. Bliss, 141 Mass. 474, 6 N. E. 527, 55 Am. Rep.
488 (1886)
52 See Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt 503 (Va. 1867), 94 Am. Dec. 478. Contra:
Nadel v. Weber Bros. Shoe Co., 70 Fla. 218, 70 So. 20, L. R. A. 1916D 1230 (1915)
"Ladd v. Ladd, 8 How. 10 (U. S. 1849); Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N. Y. 27, 4 Am.
St. Rep. 6831 (1870); Atwell v. Gordon, 135 Va. 264, 116 $. E. 386 (1923)
" Rhea v. Rhenner, 1 Pet. 105 (U. S. 1828), 7 L. ed. 72; Stitz v. Mitchell, 94
U. S. 580 (1876); annotation: 9 A. L. R. 1307; L. R. A. 1917E 283, 295.
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her husband's debts.5 Equity also permitted the spouses to sue one
another concerning the wife's separate property and permitted the
entry of a decree m rem with respect thereto."' The wife's right to
her separate estate was not dependent on her living with her husband."
The protection afforded by equity was, however, dependent upon
the intention of the donor.8 The next step was the enactment of stat-
utes by which the separate property of the wife would be recognized
in much the same way as the separate property of the husband was
recognized-not as something dependent on donor's intention, but as
a permissible status recognized by law " So, in England 0 and the
United States, statutes were enacted to remove the disabilities of
coverture, both contractual and proprietary Except in limited respects,
such statutes have attempted to give as full legal recognition to the
factual personality of the wife as the law gave to that of the husband.
The situation in the State of Oregon, for example, is a good illustration
of this principle. There neither spouse is liable for the debts and liabil-
ities of the other incurred before marriage."' Neither is liable for the
contracts and liabilities of the other contracted after marriage except
for family supplies furnished for the use of the family Expenses of
the family, and education of the children are charges on the property
of both or either of them." A married woman has the same civil rights
and privileges as the husband. Property owned by a married woman
at the time of her marriage or afterward acquired by her is hers, and
is not subject to the debts of the husband.8 Husband and wife may
contract with each other except that conveyances between them in-
tended to cut off or relinquish estates growing out of the marriage rela-
tion are void.8 ' Neither spouse has any rights in the property of the
5 Izod v. Lamb, 1 Cromp J. 35, 148 Reprint 1325 (1830)81 Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118, 174 N. E. 206, 76 A. L. R. 1359 (1931);
McKie v. McKie, 118 Ark. 68, 172 S. W 891, L. R. A. 1915A 1126 (1914)
57 Woodward v. Woodward, 148 Mo. 241, 49 S. W 1001 (1899)
"Barnum v. LeMaster, 110 Tenn. 638, 75 S. W 1045, 69 L. R. A. 353 (1903),
Doubts are resolved in favor of husband's common law rights. Lippmcott v.
Mitchell, 94 U. S. 767 (1876)
59 See CESMs, MODERN R AL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) 799, describing the evolu-
tion of English law statutes--"Thus in effect separate property in equity has given
way to statutory separate property."
60 This has been accomplished in England by a series of statutes. See CBEsmA
ibzd 798-800.
61 Oa. CoMP. LAws § 63-204 (1940), see note 95 %nfra.
62 Id. § 63-206-7.
63 Id. § 63-204.
" Jenkins v. Hall, 26 Ore. 79, 37 Pac. 62 (1894)
ESTATE PLANNING
other which can be the subject of a contract between them." A mar-
ned woman is liable on her contracts and for her torts as if unmarried.66
A married woman may sue or be sued without her husband being joined
as a party 7 Husband and wife may sue each other on contract and
possibly on tort.8 Conveyances, transfers and liens executed by either
spouse to the other are as valid as if between strangers. 6 Either spouse
may dispose of his or her property, real or personal, without joinder
of the other, but without such joinder rights of curtesy and dower are
not affected.70 Furthermore, either spouse can act as agent or attorney
m fact for the other."' It is obvious, therefore, that in Oregon the
contractual and proprietary disabilities of coverture have been sub-
stantially removed.
B. THE WASHINGTON MARITAL PROPERTY SYSTEM
Let us now turn to the marital property system of Washington. 2
Under Washington law, the separate legal personality of the wife
receives almost full and complete recognition. She has a right to retain
the ownership and control of the separate property she owns at mar-
riage." This right extends to the rents, issues and profits of such sep-
arate property " It extends also to separate property she acquires
after marriage by gift, devise or descent and the rents, issues and
profits therefrom. 8 What is true of the wife's legal personality with
respect to her separate property is also true of the husband. He retains
full freedom of ownership and control as to his separate property,
whether acquired before or after marriage, and the rents, issues and
profits therefrom. 8 From this it follows that neither spouse is liable
for the antecedent debts of the other and the separate property of
either spouse or the rents, issues or profits therefrom are not charge-
able with the debts of the other.7 8 All civil disabilities of the wife
5 ORE. Co. LAWs § 16-205 (1940).
"Id. § 63-210.
67 1c. §§ 17-101, 8; 401, 8.
GId. § 63-211.
"6d. § 63-210.
"Zd. §§ 63-210, 17-108. See Griffith v. Griffith, 74 Ore. 225, 145 Pac. 270 (1915)
7 Zd. § 63-211.
7 5For a history of the former system, see (1936) 11 WAsi. L. Rv. 1; (1939)
14 WASH. L. Rv. 118.
7 BR. REV. STAT. § 6891.
7' Zd, § 6891.
75 Id. § 6891.
TO Zd. § 6890.
7 7 Id. § 6905.
"Id. § 6905.
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which are not imposed or recognized as existing as to the husband are
abolished."9 Each spouse may contract with the other as if unmarried"
except when public policy forbids;" each may sue the other m respect
of such spouse's separate property; 2 the wife is liable for her own
torts8 and is alone liable unless the husband would be responsible
jointly if the marriage did not exist.8
With respect to family expense and the education of children, hus-
band and wife are both liable, jointly and separately 8 Their respon-
sibility as parents is equal, with the mother as fully entitled to the
custody, control and earnings of the children as the father.88 Indeed,
if the wife lives separate and apart from the hsuband, she may keep
the earnings of herself and minor children living with her, or in her
custody, as her own.8" Whether living with her husband or not, she
may receive the wages of her personal labor and sue therefor in her
own right.8"
In their dealings with each other, husband and wife are, with rare
exception, completely free. Each may give, grant, encumber and
assign to the other any proprietary interest in real or personal prop-
erty 89 Each may contract with the other; 0 and may appoint the other
attorney in fact to sell real property 11 The law has imposed certain
requirements to protect the spouses in the exercise of these rights; thus,
agreements made upon consideration of marriage-other than mutual
promises to marry-must be in writing. 2 Furthermore, in cases when
the good faith of a transaction between husband and wife is involved,
whether the transaction be between them directly or by intervention
of a third person, the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the
good faith. Again, because of claimed public policy considerations, a
contract of partnership between husband and wife is void.9 Such
7 Id. § 6901. 8O Id. § 6902.8 L Board of Trade v. Hayden, 4 Wash. 263, 30 Pac. 87, 32 Pac. 224 (1894)
82 REM REV. STAT. § 6903.
881d. § 6904.8
,Id. 6904. See Elliott, Lzabilty of the Marital Community for Torts of the
Husband and Wife (1941) 16 WAsH. L. REv. 209.
s REm REV. STAT, § 6906.
809 1. § 6907. 87 Id. § 6896.
88 Id. § 6895. Cf. §§ 181, 182, 7348.
89 Id. §§ 6900, 6901, 6890, 6891, 10572.
90 Id. § 6902.
"= Id. §§ 10573-10576.
"Id. § 5825.
98 Id. § 5828.
9' Board of Trade v. Hayden, 4 Wash. 263, 30 Pac. 87, 32 Pac. 224 (1894)
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protective provisions, it will be noticed, apply equally to husband and
wife; they do not militate against the conclusion that as to the separate
property of either spouse marriage creates no disabilities.
As to post-nuptial marital property transactions, a different situa-
tion exists in so far as concerns what is known m a number of states of
the Union"5 as community property With respect to such property,
special rules-and disabilities exist. Such property and the rights of the
spouses therein are quite different from common law marital property
even as influenced by equity and the Married Women's Property Acts.
Community property in Washington is all property acquired after
marriage by either spouse or both of them and the rents, issues and
profits from such property, regardless of the name in which the
property is held," and except post-marital separate property as above
described. 8 Separate property may become community property
through commingling and loss of identity 98 As to community property,
each spouse has a present equal undivided interest theren. 1°0 Not-
withstanding such interest, however, the husband is the sole manager of
the whole of the community property I0 He may enter into contracts
so as to bind such property "2 He may do so improvidently08 and
even over his wife's objections,1 ' because her concurrence is not nec-
05 The traditional community property states are Arizona, Califorma, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington. 11 A.m. JuR. § 1, 177.
Oklahoma has recently (July 26, 1945), provided for such a system of marital
property after an earlier (1939) attempt failed. C. L R. v. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44,
89 L. ed. 60, 65 Sup. Ct. 103 (1944), (I. T. 3782, I. R. B. 1946-4-12237) and after an
Oregon attempt was repealed. 1945 Supp. OR. Coi P. LAWs, c. 270. The new
Oregon law, effective July 5, 1947, is summarized in C. C. H., ibd, § 8703. The
Territory of Hawaii also has community property, effective June 1, 1945. I. T.
3784, I. R. B. 1946.4-12239, I. T. 3792, I. R. B. 1946-8-12289.
95 R~m. REv. STAT. § 6892. Tenancy by entireties and joint tenancy except when
created by contract do not exist in Washington. See REm. REv. STAT. § 1344.
07 Hughes v. Boyer, 5 Wn. (2d) 81, 104 P (2d) 760 (1940); Patterson v. Bowes,
78 Wash. 476, 139 P. (2d) 225 (1914)
'S REM. REV. STAT. §§ 6890, 6891.
0J Jacobs v. Hoitt, 119 Wash. 283, 205 Pac. 414 (1922) No attempt is made to
discuss the limits of tlus principle (In re Binges Estate, 5 Wn. (2d) 446, 105 P. (2d)
689 (1940)) or the application of the principle of estoppel. Federal Land Bank v.
Schidleman, 193 Wash. 435, 75 P (2d) 1010 (1938)
00 For a description of the interests of the spouses under Washington Com-
munity Property Law see: Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 75 L. ed. 239, 51 Sup.
Ct. 58 (1930); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Skoy, 51 F. Supp. 470 (D. C. Ore. 1943);
In re Coffee's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P (2d) 282 (1938)11 Pam. REV, STAT. § 6892.
202 Id. § 6892.
20BHanley v. Most, 9 Wn.(2d) 429, 461; 115 P.(2d) 933 (1941) reviews the
authorities.
101 Ibid. Fields v. Andrews, 20 Wn:(2d) 452, 148 P (2d) 313 (1944)
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essary in any disposition of personal property o' Nevertheless, the
husband is not the owner of such property He cannot so act m relation
thereto as to defraud her"' or give away substantial amounts of com-
munity property even in good faith."°' As to the real estate, the wife's
joinder in or consent to any sale, conveyance or encumbrance by the
husband is necessary-not because of her dower interest (dower and
curtesy having been abolished)'° 8-but because of the statutory re-
quirement for such joinder."9
As owner of an equal undivided interest, each spouse may dispose
of his or her own interest to the other as, for example, by gift."'
Consent of the other spouse is, of course, essential. Likewise, each
spouse may dispose of his or her community interest by will,"' or, if
there is no will, the deceased spouse dies intestate as to his or her
interest, and in case of such intestacy community property goes to the
legitimate issue of such decedent, and if there be no legitimate issue
it goes to the surviving spouse." 2 Upon death, the marital community
ends." ' The community interest of the deceased becomes the separate
property of the heir, whether he be child, or surviving spouse, or other
beneficiary " The surviving spouse's interest in what was community
property becomes the separate property of such spouse when distrib-
uted under the decree of distribution,"' .or by the nonintervention
executor."' The entire community interest is, however, subject to ad-
ministration expenses, debts chargeable against the community prop-
erty, family allowance, homestead exemption, and the inheritance and
105 Hanley v. Most, 9 Wn. (2d) 429, 115 P (2d) 933 (1941), Fields v. Andrus, 20
Wn. (2d) 452, 148 P (2d) 313 (1944) Rmw. REV. STAT. § 6892.
108 This result is implicit in decisions involving gifts by husbands.
107 Parker v. Parker, 121 Wash. 24, 207 Pac. 1062 (1922); Marston v. Rue, 92
Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916), Nemey v. Nemey, 182 Wash. 194, 45 P (2d) 949
(1935), In re McCoy's Estate, 189 Wash. 103, 63 P (2d) 522 (1937), Occidental Life
Insurance Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P (2d) 27 (1937)
10 8 REm. REV. STAT. § 6897.
109 Id. § 6893.
110 Id. § 1342. Independently of the statute the spouses may by agreement
convert separate into community property and vnce versa, Volz v. Zang, 113
Wash. 378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920), O'Bryan v. C. I. R., 42 F (2d) 456 (C. C. A. 9th,
1945), Jurs v. C. I. R., 147 F (2d) 805 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945) Cf. C. I. R. v. Harmon,
323 U. S. 44, 89 L. ed. 60, 65 Sup. Ct. 103 (1944)
111 REmw. REV. STAT. §§ 1342, 1394.
112 Id. § 1342.
128Community property presupposes acquisition during marriage (REM.
REv. STAT. § 6892) wich is dissolved by death.
'4 Rmvr. REV. STAT. §§ 6890, 6891.
118 Id. §§ 6890, 6891, 1533.
111 Schirmer v Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 Pac. 265 (1930)
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estate taxes, if any I" Upon divorce the marital community also ends.""8
The disposition of the community property meanwhile acqured (and
separate property as well) is made by the court's interlocutory divorce
decree.' If the Washington court's decree omits to mention any item
of community property, the divorced spouses become tenants in com-
mon of such property 2 ' and the interest of each spouse as such tenant
in common becomes that spouse's separate property
C. CONFLICT OF LAW PRINCIPLES IN MARITAL PROPERTY
The common -law and community marital property systems having
been described, what is the relationship between the two when the
marital property of one system impinges upon or comes in contact
with the marital property system of the other? The two systems inter-
act in at least two ways: first, when marital property is removed from
a common law to a community property jurisdiction or vice versa, the
problem of the legal effect of such removal immediately presents itself;
second, if marital property is removed, what effect can local law have
on such removed property? 2'
As to the first problem, the important governing principles may be
summarized as follows: In general, pre-existing marital property inter-
ests in movables" or mimovables 22 are not divested or affected by
removal of the property or its proceeds across state lines, nor by the
mere fact of change of domicile of its owners.' 2' Hence, interests of
spouses in community property are retained when such property is
227 Lang v. C. I. R., 304 U. S. 264, 82 L. ed. 1331, 58 Sup. Ct. 880 (1938); Re Hopff-
garten's Estate, 186 Wash. 546, 549, 59 P (2d) 298 (1936) RmYL REv. STAT. §§ 1342,
11201 et. seq.
2S An interlocutory decree of divorce probably ends marriage for community
property acquisition purposes (See Brown v. Brown, 192 Wash. 333, 73 P (2d)
795 (1937)) although marriage relation is not terminated until entry of final
divorce decree. Chusholm's Estate, 159 Wash. 674, 294 Pac. 973 (1930); Madden's
Estate, 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.(2d) 280 (1934) If, however, final decree is never
entered or cannot be, interin accumulations would probably be community
property.
19 R=T. IMy. STAT. § 989, et. seq.
20 Harvey v. Pocock, 92 Wash. 625, 159 Pac. 771 (1916); James v. James, 51
Wash. 60, 97 Pac. 1113 (1908)
1 For a discussion of these and other conflict of law problems, see Horowitz,
Confliet of Law Problems -n Community Property (1936) 11 WAsH. L. Rav. 121.
122Re Gulstines' Estate, 166 Wash. 325, 6 P (2d) 628 (1932), RESTATEMnNT,
COMNUCT OF LAWS § 291.
12 Reference here, of course, is to proceeds, Cooke v. Fidelity Etc. Co., 104 Ky.
473, 47 S. W 328 (1898) wrongfully applies the domiciliary law of owner.
1' Succession of Popp, 146 La. 464, 83 So. 765 (1920) Bonati v. Welsch, 24 N. Y.
157 (1861); annotation: 92 A. L. R. 1347, 1348. Bates v. Papesch, 30 Ida. 529, 116
Pac. 270 (1917) applied same rule as to debt between husband and wife.
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removed to a common law jurisdiction, " and separate property re-
moved from a common law to a community property jurisdiction
remains separate property 12I Removal of property may, however, have
an important effect upon the consequences of ownership. The new
jurisdiction may have laws differing from the old as to descent and
distribution following death"' or as to the availability of dower and
curtesy 28 or homestead exemption' " and liability on execution, 8 or
as to remedies available for the protection of property rights,'8' or as
to the character of the property being real or personal,'82 or as to other
consequences of ownership. 8' The consequences of ownership in the
old jurisdiction do not attach to the property removed so as to be part
and parcel of it and entitled to the same consitutional protection as is
applicable to the ownership itself. 8 '
As to the second problem, the effect of local law on removed prop-
erty, the governing principles may be summarized as follows: Removed
marital property may be used in the acquisition of new property m
12 DePas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848) Edwards v. Edwards,
108 Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477 (1925) RESTATEMENT, CONzFLICT OF LAWS § 292.
112 Annotation: 92 A. L. R. 1347, 1350. Wife's separate property remains separate
after removal. Avery v. Avery, 12 Tex. 54, 62 Am. Dec. 513 (1854) (to Texas);
Freeburger v. Gazzam, 5 Wash. 772, 32 Pac. 732 (1893) (to Washington)
112 The law of situs applies as to imovables. The situs law may, however,
adopt the domiciliary law. See Frick v. Pennsylvama, 268 U. S. 473, 69 L. ed.
1058, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 605 (1925) Or a state may provide that the situs law should
control distribution of a deceased's movables, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith
Hurd, 1929) c. 6, § 7; c. 39, § 1; MISS. CODE. ANN. (1930) § 1401.
128 Thomas v. Woods, 173 Fed. 585 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 248 (1)
129 In Moody v. Barker, 188 Ky. 401, 222 S. W 89 (1920) it was held that home-
stead exemption is governed by the lex ton.
130 Wick v. Dawson, 42 W Va. 43, 24 S. E. 587 (1896) In Walker v. Goetz,
218 S. W 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 569, it was held lex loct contractus governs.
See LaSelle v. Woolery, 14 Wash. 70, 44 Pac. 115 (1896)
I" See inkson v. Williams, 41 N. J. L. 35 (1879) (procedure for imposing
liability for necessaries), Slater v. Mexican Natl. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 48 L. ed.
900, 24 Sup. Ct. 581 (1904) (tort)
1'2 Minor v. Cardwell, 37 Mo. 350, 90 Am. Dec. 390 (1866) (slaves), note 57
L. R. A. 353, 359 (1902), RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 208.
" This seems preferable to the term "incident" as used in McKAY, COm-
muNiTy PROPERTY (2 Ed. 1925) § 652; Leflar, Community Property and the Conflict
of Laws (1933) 21 CALIF. L. REv. 221, 227.
"I Any attempt by a state to divest interests in marital property by the mere
fact of removal from another state into its own, or by a mere change of domicile,
would probably be in violation of the due process, and equal privilege and
immunities clauses of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Brook-
man v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907), Re Thornton's Estate, 1 Cal. (2d)
1, 33 P (2d) 1, 92 A. L. R. 1343 (1934), cf. Spreckles v. Spreckles, 116 Cal. 339, 48
Pac. 228 (1897)
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the new jurisdiction by purchase, exchange or other dealing, or may
become the source of rents, issues and profits. In general, in both
common law and community property states, the character of interests
in the new property is the same as that of the old." 5 Thus, if com-
munity property is used to purchase land in the common law state, the
interest of the spouses in community property will be retainedlm the
land by making the husband a resulting trustee of his wife's interest
theren. 150 If the husband uses the separate property from a common
law jurisdiction to acquire movable or immovables in a community
property jurisdiction, the property so acquired will be treated as his
separate property both at law and in Equity 117 Again, local law may
determine the status of rents, issues and profits of foreign-acquired
property brought into the state as partaking of the character of the
property from which they issue," or as partaking of a different char-
acter." 9 Thus, a statute might provide that property locally acquired
by residents or non-residents with the proceeds of separate property
shall become community property This was once the law in Washing-
ton." ' Today, however, the proceeds of separate property, no matter
where derived, are treated as separate property 1 1 Finally, the local
law may permit the spouses to determine the nature of their marital
property by agreement. Thus, under Washington law, it is competent
for spouses by agreement to change their separate property into com-
munity property or community into separate property 42 Even an oral
235 Myers v. Vavette, 146 Wash. 1, 261 Pac. 647 (1927); Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo.
314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848); annotation: 92 A. L. R. 1347, 1350, 1352.
130 Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848); annotation: 92 A. L. R.
1347, 1352. Proof of community interest must be had, but courts indulge pre-
sumption that foreign law is the same as lex f o See Thorn v. Weatherly, 50
Ark. 237, 7 S. W 33 (1887)
187 Avery v. Avery, 12 Tex. 54, 62 Am. Dec. 513 (1854); Freeburger v. Gazzam,
5 Wash. 772, 32 Pac. 732 (1893), Meyers v. Albert, 76 Wash. 218, 135 Pac. 1003
(1913); Brunner v. Title Ins. & T. Co., 26 Cal. App. 35, 145 Pac. 741 (1914); Brook-
man v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907); Douglass v. Douglass, 22 Ida.
336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912)
188 Such is the domestic rule of Arizona, California, New Mexico, Nevada,
Texas and Washington. MCKATY, Cowux= PRoPERTY (2 Ed. 1925) § 200.
239 The domestic rule in Idaho and Louisiana makes such proceeds common.
In Louisiana proceeds of wife's separate property are common unless she retains
its administration in her hands. McKAY, Commiu= PaoPzERY (2d ed. 1925) § 200.
10 Wash. Laws 1871, p. 67, § 2, repealed Wash. Laws 1873, p. 486. See Guye
v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, 115 Pac. 731 (1911)
"'EM. REV, STAT. § 6890-1.
143 State ex rel. Van Moss v. Sailors, 180 Wash. 269, 274, 3 P. (2d) 397 (1934),
Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 382, 194 Pac. 409 (1920). This principle is recognized
for tax purposes. Note 110 supra, 160 tnfra.
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agreement to such effect is sufficient as to personal property, although
as to real property a written agreement is necessary because of the
Statute of Frauds. 48 In connection with the matter of agreement, it
might be well to further point out that if the spouses permit their
separate and community property to be commingled so that the identity
of the separate property is lost, the local law will treat the whole as
community property '4 Such commingling may occur by agreement,
but such agreement is not necessary If commingling occurs, no matter
how or for what reason, the result follows.
D. CONTRASTING TAX CONSEQUENCES OF MARITAL
PROPERTY SYSTEMS
The common law and community property marital property systems
have well-known tax consequences based upon their contrasting
natures. Thus, in a community property state each spouse is subject
to a federal income tax on only one-half of the community income, and
each spouse has the benefit of certain deductions as if unmarried. 4 "
In common law states, however, the income subject to federal income
tax is reportable by and taxable solely to the husband." ' Again, for gift
and inheritance tax purposes, the vested interest of each spouse is
fully recognized in Washington. Hence, a gift of community property
in Washington to a third person is deemed a gift of one-half thereof
made by each spouse. 4 Upon the death of a spouse, the inheritance
tax assessable is assessable solely with respect to the half of the com-
218 REm. REV. STAT. § 5825. Cf. REW. REV. STAT. § 6894.
"'Jacobs v. Hoitt, 119 Wash. 283, 205 Pac. 414 (1922)
1'l Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 75 L. ed. 239, 51 Sup. Ct. 58 (1930), cf. Lang
v. C. I. R., 304 U. S. 264, 82 L. ed. 1331, 58 Sup. Ct. 880 (1938) See LeSourd,
Community Property Status of Income from Bustness Involmng Personal Sermnes
and Separate Capital (1947) 22 WASH. L. REV. 18; Manning v. C. I. R., 8 T. C.
No. 63 (1947)
146 Since he owns all the income. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 75 L. ed.
239, 51 Sup. Ct. 58 (1939), RABIN & JoHNsON, FEDERAL INCOME, GnT AND ESTATE
TAXATxON, 903, et seq. If a tenancy by entireties is involved, however, the income
is reportable one half by each. Sandberg v. C. I. R., 8 T. C. No. 52 (1947) (in-
volving Oregon tenancy) See also discussion of joint tenancies znfra. The use
of "family partnerships," particularly in common law jurisdictions, has been
resorted to to split the family income, but the field of permissible use has been
much narrowed. C. I. R. v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280, 90 L. ed. 670, 66 Sup. Ct. 532
(1946) See PAUL, TAXATiON FOR PROsPERITY, 297-300. An attempt has been made
to apply the principle of the Tower case to gifts of family corporation stock. See
Mannheimer, Income Tax Status of Family Corporation Stock (July, 1947) 25
TAXES-THE TAX MAGAzinE 604.
147 REv. REV. STAT. § 11218-11 (b)
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munity property left by the decedent." 8 Furthermore, a decedent
Washington spouse is entitled, for example, to the statutory insurance
inheritance tax exemption as if the community property interest left
was the decedent's separate property14 9
In common law jurisdictions the gift tax would be imposed upon the
entire gift, and the inheritance tax would be imposed upon the entire
estate of the husband if he died, and no inheritance tax would be
assessed upon the death of the wife because she did not own any
property transmitted by her death."'
' By virtue of the 1942 Federal Gift and Estate Tax Amendments, 51
Congress has attempted to obliterate the differences taxwise between
common law and community property Thus, all gifts of community
property are deemed made by the husband except to the extent that
the community property can be shown to have been derived from the
personal earnings of the wife or derived originally from such earmngs
or from the separate property of the wife. 5 2 Likewise, the Federal
Estate Tax is computed on the basis of the entire community estate
except to the extent that the survivor can show that the community
estate was derived from compensation for personal services rendered
by the survivor or derived originally from such compensation or from
the separate property of the survivor, with the mmimum of one-half
of the community estate (because subject to testamentary disposition
in Washington) being taxed in any event." 2 The matter of the tax
consequences to be considered in estate planning will be considered in
greater detail hereinafter, but enough has been here stated to point out
",S Re Coffee's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P. (2d) 283 (1938) See Lang v. C. L R.,
304 U. S. 264, 82 L. ed. 1331, 58 Sup. Ct. 880 (1938); In re Towey's Estate, 22
Wn. (2d) 212, 155 P. (2d) 273 (1945)
1
,"Re Coffee's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P (2d) 283 (1938) permitted entire
$40,000 insurance proceeds exemption (REM. REV. STAT. § 11211 (b)) to be taken
from the deceased husband's half of the community insurance estate. To same
effect prior to the 1942 Revenue Act Amendments, see Lang v. C. I. R., 304 U. S.
264, 82 L. ed. 1331, 58 Sup. Ct. 880 (1938)
150 See 1 RABKZN & JOHNsON, FEDERAL INcoME, GIFT Aim ESTATE TAXATION, 931, 903,
et seq. The test is that provided by local law: whose property is it?
23Rev. Act of 1942 §§ 404 (life insurance) 453 (gifts) 402 (community estate
tax). INT. REV. CODE §§ 811(d) (5), 811(e) (2), 811(g), 1000(d).
2
5
21NT. REV. CODE § 1000(d); Reg. 108, § 86.2(c) Corresponding provision has
been made for transfers in contemplation of death. INT. REV. CODE § 811(d) (5)
Thus changed the prior law, except where wife's interest was a mere expectancy.
Gillis v. Welch, 80 F. (2d) 165 (1935) cert, dented, 297 U. S. 722, 80 L. ed. 1006,
56 Sup. Ct. 668 (1936)
153IN. REv. CODE §§ 811(e)2, (g) (1), 811(d) (5)
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important differences taxwise resulting from the contrasting marital
property systems above reviewed.1"
III.
THE GIFT TAX SCHEME AND ESTATE PLANNING
IN WASHINGTON
A. INTRODUCTORY
It will be recalled that income tax, gift tax, inheritance tax and estate
tax rates are each placed on a progressive basis rather than on a flat
basis."" If, therefore, property ownership can be split up so that the
tax base is smaller, tax savings necessarily result because the applicable
top bracket of such tax is lower; and if a gift tax is payable, the tax
is on the lower brackets and at rates less than corresponding inheri-
tance and estate tax rates. Furthermore, the timing of property division
makes available cumulative tax exemptions with resulting tax sav-
mgs.1' It becomes important, therefore, to briefly outline the available
methods of property division both before and after death in view of
the applicable tax consequences, state and federal.
The obvious method of property division inter vnvos is through the
medium of gifts. " For state and federal tax purposes, a gift is not
merely one as defined at common law; any transfer of property for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth involves a taxable gift if the fair value of the property trans-
ferred is in excess of the annual exclusions and gift tax exemptions
recognized by law "I In that connection, attention should be called to
the fact that income cannot be divided for tax purposes merely by
turning it over as received or assigning the right to receive it. The
property which produces the income must be given away as well as
' For a discussion of conflict of law principles in respect of taxation of trusts
and trust income, see 2 NosSAmAx, TRusT ADwmvmTRTxoN Arm TAxATION, c.
XLIII, p. 226, et seq.
1851 R=4, REV. STAT. §§ 11218-12 (gift tax, 11202 (inheritance tax) INT. REV.
CODE § 810, 935(b) (estate tax), 1001(a) (b) (c) (d) (gift tax) 11-15 (income
tax)
"' Donor's taxable estate is also reduced by the amount of gift tax. But for
the gift, the beneficiary would have to pay an estate tax based upon the
deceased's estate augmented by the amount of the gift tax. See also note 269
%l ra.
21 Income tax savings are effected by donee if gifts of low market value but
of high cost are given away. In event of sale by donee, donor's cost basis may be
used for his income tax purposes.
158INT. REV. CODE §§ 1000. 1002; Reg. 105, § 86.2. REm. REV. STAT. § 11218-13.
RAS=I & JOHNsON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIrT AND ESTATE TAXATION, p. 2908b et seq.
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the income itself before a gift (though recognized for gift tax pur-
poses"') is recognized for income tax purposes."'0
A gift tax is payable on the amount by which the value of the prop-
erty transferred exceeds the value of the consideration in money or
money's worth received therefor.",' Thus, bargain purchases may in-
volve a gift tax liability This is true regardless of donative intent. 82
The phrase "money or money's worth" renders taxable many transfers
that would otherwise not be gifts as that term is understood at common
law," e.g., transfer in consideration of an intended wife's giving up
her right to income from the trust created by a former husband."8'
This does not mean that common law considerations are not important;
they are important,18e especially on the question of delivery Thus,
a revocable gift is not a delivered gift, neither is a transfer in trust
with reserved power to change the beneficiaries or their interests in the
trust-and, hence, they are not taxable gifts.86 Furthermore, the date
of the gift may be important on the question of the taxable year appli-
cable. The date is to be determined by the date of delivery-a com-
mon law concept.6 7
130 Cerfe v. C. I. R., 141 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944)
140 Harrison v. Schaffner, 812 U. S. 579, 85 L. ed. 1055, 65 Sup. Ct. 759 (1941);
Helvermg v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 85 L. ed. 75, 61 Sup. Ct. 144 (1940); Helvermg
v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122, 85 L. ed. 81, 61 Sup. Ct. 149 (1940) Cf. Blair v. C. I. R.,
300 U. $. 5, 81 L. ed. 1165, 57 Sup. Ct. 380 (1937), upholding assignment by life
tenant of portion of trust income as giving assignee an interest in comus. In
family partnership cases when the wife contributes neither her own new capital
nor services, even a gift transfer of business interest will not be recognized for
income tax purposes. Lusthaus v. C. I. R., 327 U. S. 293, 90 L. ed. 679, 66 Sup.
Ct. 539 (1948); C. L R. v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280, 90 L. ed. 670, 66 Sup Ct. 532
(1946). Although agreements between spouses converting their separate into
community property are valid for local law purposes (Voiz. v. Zang, 113 Wash.
378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920)) and federal income tax purposes (O'Bryan v. C. I. R., 148
F.(2d) 456 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945); Schoenhair v. C. I. R., 45 B. T. A. 576 (1941);
Somerville v. C. I. R., 123 F. (2d) 975 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941)) it is doubtful if an
agreement merely that the income from separate property should be community
would be recognized for income tax purposes. Florence v. Cruickshank, 23
B. T. A. 493 (1931); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 74 L. ed. 731, 50 Sup. Ct. 241
(1930)101 i . Rzv. CODE §§ 1000, 1002, Reg. 108, § 86.2; RBwv, Bav. STAT. § 11218-13.
163 Reg. 108, § 86.8.
268 Reg. 108, § 86.8. Cf. Farid-Es-Sutaneh v. C. I. R., 160 F. (2d) 812 (C. C. A.
2d, 1947) involving income tax.
16, C. I. R. v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303, 89 L. ed. 958, 65 Sup. Ct. 652 (1945).
205 RAimN & JoNsoN, FEaDERA INco , GrT AxD ESTATE TAxATiox, No. G1 § 4,
p. 2908b et seq.
106 Beg. 108, § 86.3.
107 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Huey, 23 F. Supp. 831, afd. 101 F. (2d) 9
(1939)
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Before considering the different types of gifts for tax purposes, let
us briefly outline the Washington and Federal gift tax scheme.
B. WASHINGTON GIFT TAX
Under the Washington law since i941, gifts of separate or com-
munity property, if in excess of the annual exclusions and applicable
exemptions, are taxable."' The tax applies whether the gift be m trust
or otherwise, whether direct or indirect, and whether the property is
real, personal, tangible or intangible. As to residents of the state, the
tax applies to gifts of any property except real or personal property
permanently located outside the state. As to non-residents, the tax
applies only if the property is real or tangible personalty permanently
located within the state.19 Thus it would seem that a gift of a New
York bank account by a resident of Washington would be taxable
whether or not made within the state; but the same gift by a non-resi-
dent made within the state would not be taxable.
If the gift is one of community property by one or both spouses to
a third person, two gifts are deemed to be made-one by each spouse
for one-half of the whole value of the property transferred.1Y0
The Washington gift tax is imposed on the aggregate total of all
"net gifts" for each calendar year and all prior years at rates and with
exemptions based on the relationship of donor and donee.' The term
"net gifts" means the total amount of gifts made during the calendar
year less authorized charitable deductions and less an annual exclusion
of $3,000 per donee other than a gift of future interests in property...
Donees are divided into three classes: Class A, B and C.YI The gift
tax rates and exemptions for each class vary Class A beneficiaries
are grandparents, parents, spouses, children, step-children, adopted
children, or lineal descendants of any adopted child, son-m-law, daugh-
ter-in-law, or any lineal descendant of donor or adopted child of lineal
descendant of donor. The donor is permitted a $zo,ooo exemption of
any amount passing to Class A, such exemption to be taken from the
first $25,000 of the gift. The rates are small, being go% of the cor-
responding inheritance tax rates as to Class A beneficiaries. They
commence with go% of i% of the first $25,000 and end with 9o of
io% of all amounts in excess of $500,000. Class B beneficiaries are
brothers and sisters of the donor. The exemption is $i,ooo to be taken
8 REIV. REV. STAT. §§ 11218-11 to 11218-42. '171 1d. § 11218-12.
1 I9. § 11218-11. 172 Id. § 11218-14, 15.
lo Id. § 11218-11 (b) 3 IM. § 11218-12.
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from the first $5,000 of gifts to such beneficiary or beneficiaries. The
rates are higher than Class A rates. They commence with 9o% of 3%
of the first $5,000 and end with 9o% of 20% of all amounts m excess
of $xoo,ooo. All other beneficiaries (other than charitable) fall m
Class C, for which class no exemption exists. The rates are fairly high.
They commence with go% of io% up to $io,ooo and end with go% of
25% on amounts in excess of $5o,ooo. From the total tax on all net
gifts during the calendar year and all prior years since the commence-
ment of 1941, there is deducted the amount of all gift taxes previously
paid the state. The balance is the gift tax owing.' 4 The tax is payable
the March 15th following the close of the calendar year in which the
gift is made, a gift tax return being required to be filed on or before
that time." 5
As a result of the annual exclusions and exemptions provided by the
Washington Gift Tax Law, spouses may make tax-free gifts of as
much as $26,0oo in community property to a Class A beneficiary,
e.g., a child, since each spouse is deemed to make one-half of the gift
and each spouse is entitled to a $3,ooo annual exclusion and a $io,ooo
exemption. Likewise, each spouse can make a gift to a Class A bene-
ficiary of as much as $13,000 of separate property
As to Class B beneficiary; spouses may make a tax-free community
property gift of $6,ooo since each is entitled to a $3,000 exclusion
whether it be separate or community property If the gift exceeds
$6,ooo in community property, the donor spouse whose brother or
sister is involved may take the benefit of a Class B exemption up to
$S,ooo, but the other spouse may not do so since the donee is neither
brother nor sister, but rather brother-m-law or sister-in-law
As to Class C beneficiaries, a community property gift of $6,ooo is
tax-free, or a gift of $3,000 each of their respective separate property,
because of the annual exclusion provisions.
Prior to June 6, 1945, the annual exclusion of $3,000 could be taken
even with respect of future interests in property '" This is no longer
true. Hence, a gift in trust payable when a minor child becomes 21
174 Id. § 11218-12. The last amendment was Wash. Laws 1945, c. 206. The
exemptions for gifts to persons in Classes A and B are not stated to be lifetime
exemptions as is the $30,000 lifetime exemption for federal gift tax purposes. It
would seem possible, therefore, to take the exemptions repeatedly every year.
There is a question whether this is the intended result.
273 Rmw. REV, STAT. § 11218-17.
%78 Id. § 11218-14 (b) Wash. Laws 1941, c. 119 § 4.
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years of age is a gift of a future interest and the donor is not entitled
to the benefit of the annual exclusion with respect to such gift.'
C. FEDERAL GIFT TAX
The Federal Gift Tax Law (after which, in certain respects only,
the Washington gift tax law is apparently patterned) taxes every
transfer by an individual of property by gift, whether in trust or other-
wise, whether the gift be direct or indirect, whether the property be
real or personal, tangible or intangible.1 8 Here, too, the tax is not
limited to gifts as known at common law As in the case of taxable
transfers in Washington, gift taxes are imposed on transfers (sales or
exchanges) for less than an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth, measured on the amount by which the value of the
property exceeds the value of the consideration paid by the "donee."I"
The tax is imposed on all donor individuals, resident or non-resident
citizens or aliens, save that in the case of a non-resident not a citizen
of the United States, it applies only to gifts of property situated within
the United States.'
Prior to October 22, I942, gifts of community property were treated
as gifts by each spouse to the extent of one-half thereof just as if each
spouse made a gift of separate property' Since October 22, 1942, all
gifts of community property are deemed made by the husband as if
from his property, except to the extent that it can be shown that the
property given away was received as compensation for personal serv-
ices actually rendered by the wife or derived originally from such
compensation or from the separate property of the wife. 8 ' The lan-
guage of the statute is so sweeping that a gift by a wife of her com-
munity interest to her husband would be a gift by the husband to
17 7 Id. § 11218-14 (b) Wash. Laws 1945, c. 206, § 2, p. 591.
18 INr. REV. CODE § 1000 (b) The gift tax is designed to supplement the Estate
Tax. Sanford v. C. I. R., 308 U. S. 39, 84 L. ed. 21, 60 Sup. Ct. 51 (1939)
'7 INT. REV. CODE § 1002. Value of the gift is not reducable by the amount of
the gift tax. Affelder v. C. I. R., 7' T. C. No. 141. As illustration of the reach of
the gift tax statute, see Wolfe, Somethtng New %n Gift and Estate Taxes (Mar.
1947) 25 TAXEs-TEE TAX MAGAZINE, 217.
ISO INT. REV. CODE § 1000 (a) (b)
18' Id. §§ 1000, 1003, 1004. Where the wife's interest was not a vested right but
a mere expectancy, the gift was treated as a single gift by the husband. Gills
v. Welch, 80 F (2d) 165 (1935), cert. demed, 297 U. S. 722, 80 L. ed. 1006, 56 Sup.
Ct. 668 (1936)
1 82 IiNT. REV. CODE § 1000(d) The constitutionality of this section has been
upheld in Charles I. Francis, 8 T. C. No. 91 (1947) and G. H. Beavers, T. C. Mem.
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himself-hence a nullity, and hence not taxable.'88
The gift tax is imposed on the aggregate of the "net gifts" made since
the enactment of the 1932 Revenue Act, and from such tax is deducted
the amount of the tax on the aggregate sum of net gifts for each of the
calendar years preceding the calendar year for which the tax is being
computed, such tax being computed at the rates and with the ex-
emptions in effect in the year for which the return is being filed.18' The
applicable annual exclusions, however, are those in effect in the years
when the gifts were made.' For the year 1938 and prior thereto, the
annual exclusion for each donee other than a future interest in property
was $5,ooo. 88 For the calendar year 1939 to and including 1942, other
than gifts of future interests in property and gifts in trust, it was
$4,000."' Commencing with 1943, and with respect to gifts other than
those of future interests in property, it is $3,ooo.188
Against gifts made by a citizen or resident, there is allowed a specific
exemption of $3o,o0oo,' less the amount claimed and allowed since
June 6, 1932, whether the gift be one in trust or of a future interest in
property 1 0 The donor may take this exemption in a single year or
spread it over a period of years.'' Prior to 1936, the specific exemption
was $50,000; from 1936 to 1942, inclusive, it was $40,000; since then
it has been $30,ooo.19' However, the exemption for years prior to 1943
may not exceed $30,000, if the tax is being computed for 1943 or
thereafter.'98
The tax rates are progressive and are based on "net gifts." The
rates have changed four times (Act of 1934, 1935, 194o and 1941),
but today they start at 2Y % on the first $5,000 and go as high as
5732/4 on gifts over $io,ooo,ooo.' 94
182 Ct, REm. REV. STAT. § 11218-11 (b) Corresponding provision has been made
for transfers in contemplation of death. INT. REV. CODE § 811(d) (5) However,
a gift by the husband of community property to his wife is prima fame a gift
of the whole for federal gift tax purposes, Reg. 108, § 86.2 (c) If either spouse
converts separate into community property on or after Jan. 1, 1943 there is no
federal gift tax, Reg. 108, § 86.2(c)l'gI-T. REV. CODE §§ 1000, 1003, 1004.
28 Id. § 1003(b) 186 Id. § 1003 (b) (1)
2871 d. § 1003(b) (2)
268 Id. § 1003 (b) (3) Future interests are defined in Reg. 108, § 86.11.
'
891d. § 1004(a) (1)
2"0 The statute contains no limitation on the gifts with respect to which this
exception may be taken.
0'INvT. REV. CODE § 1004(a) (1); Reg. 108, § 86.12.
2"- Id. § 1004 (a) (1)
1o Id, § 1001. 21 IM. § 1001.
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It will be noted that the relationship of donor and donee has nothing
whatsoever to do with the rates. The tax is imposed on net gifts,
regardless of the donee and his relationship to the donor. Charitable
gifts are, however, tax-free.19
It follows that a gift may be taxable simultaneously by both the
State of Washington and by the United States. A spouse may make
an initial gift free of federal tax up to $33,000 in one calendar year to
one donee, but if the property is community and the donee is a Class
A beneficiary, such as donor's child, then only $26,ooo thereof will be
free of the state gift tax. Both under the Washington gift tax law and
the federal gift tax law, a donor may make tax-free gifts except of future
interests in property to any number of donees and regardless of their
relationship if the gift to each does not exceed $3,o00 .1" Thus, spouses
with children may transfer a substantial portion of their estate initially
and thereafter annually, taking advantage of their annual exclusions
and exemptions, free of tax and thereby obtain important tax savings
which would otherwise be payable on the transmission of property at
death.19
D. TYPES OF TAXABLE GIFTS
1. COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE GIFTS
We have been largely considering the gift problem m its simplest
form-usually a money or tangible property transfer of an out-and-
out character. Gifts are not, of course, confined to conventional and
simple gifts of money or tangible property The following types of
gifts, for example, are for federal gift tax purposes, taxable gifts: The
transfer of a contingent interest;"9 ' the exercise or release of a power
of appointment 9 created since October 22, 1942 '0 (except a release
19 Id. § 1004(a) (2)
296 Id. § 1003 (b) (3), REm. REV. STAT. § 11218-14. To obtain maximum income
tax advantage to the donee in the event he sells the property, assets of high cost
value should be given away because the donee retains the donor's cost basis for
income tax gain purposes. INT. REv. CODE § 113 (2)
117 Unless in contemplation of death, or intended to take effect in possession
or en3oyment at or after death. INT. REV. CODE § 811(C), REM. REV. STAT. §
11201. Gifts within two years of death are presumptively in contemplation of
death. REM. REV. STAT. § 11201 (a) INr. REV. CODE § 811 (c)
198 Goodwin v. McGowan, 47 Fed. Supp. 798 (D. C. N. Y. 1942), Reg. 108, I
19.113 (a) (2)-1 (b) amended by T. D. 5137 (April 11, 1942)
19 INT. REV. CODE § 1000 (c) amended by Rev. Act. of 1942 § 452 (a), Reg. 108,
§ 86.2 (b)
200 Rev. Act of 1942 § 452 (b)
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prior to the ist day of July, 1948;.2. the transfer of a joint interest;2" '
the assignment of a life insurance policy 8 or irrevocable designation of
a life insurance beneficiary, even though the right of the assignee or
beneficiary to receive the proceeds is conditioned upon his surviving the
insured; "' transfers for consideration to the extent that they are made
for consideration not in money or money's worth;20" surrender of
powers to revoke or amend a trust;20  an agreement between spouses
dividing community property into separate property 207
Taxable gifts should be distingushed from what for tax purposes at
least are incomplete gifts or invalid gifts208 and hence non-taxable gifts.
The following types of gifts' illustrate this principle: A gift in trust
with power reserved in the trustor to change beneficiaries even to others
than himself, or to otherwise amend or revoke the trust, is incomplete
until the reserved power is relinquished; 2 9 a revocable gift whether or
not in trust is incomplete unless the consent of an adversely interested
201 Pub. L. No. 112, 80th Cong., C. C. H. FEDERAL, ESTATE & Gnv TAx REP. § 3460
A, 3460 I, 3925, 3925 A. For prior law see Rev. Act. of 1942 § 452 (c) as amended H.
J. Res. 353, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (May 29, 1946) The subject as confused. See
RAEKnN AND JomNsoN, FEDERAL Ixcorz, GET mw ESTATE TAXATI N, p. 2916c. H. J.
Res. became law on June 25, 1947, and extends to December 31, 1949, the period
for tax-free release for the power of appointment.
20Reg. 108, § 86.2 (a) (4) (5) See also Reg. 108, § 86.19(h), tenancy by entirety
on war savings bond. See Mim. 5202, 1941-2 C. B. 241, setting forth the gift and
estate tax status of U. S. savings, defense and war bonds, C. C. H. FEDERAL,
ESTATE & GiFT TAx REP. § 3391.909.
20R Beg. 108, § 86.2 (a) (8)
20 Reg. 108, § 86.2 (a) (8) The value of the gift in the case of single premium
policies is not the cash surrender value, but replacement cost. Guggenheim v.
Resquin, 312 U. S. 254, 85 L. ed. 813, 61 Sup. Ct. 507 (1941); Byerson v. U. S.,
312 U. S. 405, 85 L. ed. 917, 61 Sup. Ct. 656 (1941) As to annual premium policies,
see Reg. No. 108, § 89.16 (i); James T. Lockhart Est., 46 B. T. A. 426 (1942) suggest-
ing replacement cost.
20'REm REV. STAT. § 11218-13, to same effect. INT. REv, CODE §§ 1001, 1002. The
release of a claim for alimony and support in consideration. of an alimony trust
is not a taxable gift, being a consideration of money's worth. Property settlement
for deceased wife is not a taxable gift. Judson v. C. I. R., T. C. (1947)
206 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 77 L. ed. 748, 53 Sup. Ct. 369 (1933)
REm. REv. STAT. § 11218-11 (c) to same effect.
207 Reg. 108, § 86.2. This regulation also treats on agreement changing com-
munity property into joint estate or tenancy by entireties as taxable gifts.
208 Colman v. Coiman, 25 Wn. (2d) 606, 171 P (2d) 691 (1946), Smith Estate v.
C. I. R., 140 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944)
209 See annotation: 166 A. L. R. 448 (1947) Such a release is not necessarily
in contemplation of death. Allen v. Trust Company of Georgia, 149 F. (2d) 120
(C. C. A. 5th, 1945), Rasqum v. Humphreys, 308 U. S. 54, 85 L. ed. 77, 60 Sup. Ct.
620 (1939), Sanford v. C. I. R., 308 U. S. 39, 84 L. ed. 20, 60 Sup. Ct. 51 (1939),
see also INT. REV. CODE § 1000 (e), Estate of G. F Fiske v. C. I. R., T. C. M. Docket
No. 4106, decided Jan. 21, 1946; Estate of E. E. Nettleton v. C. I. R., 4 T. C. 987
(1945) REm. REV. STAT. § 11218-11 (c)
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person is necessary to effect revocation,21 ° a gift of community prop-
erty by a wife to her husband is ineffective as a gift by the wife because
the statute makes all gifts of community property gifts by the hus-
band.21' Gifts which are incomplete for gift tax purposes may be com-
plete even though certain reversionary rights in gifts m trust are re-
tained. Thus a gift in trust subject to reversion to the donor on the
beneficiary predeceasing him is a valid gift of the entire interest, less
the value of the reversionary interest, determinable by recognized
actuarial methods.21" If a gift is incomplete for gift tax purposes, the
subject of the gift is includable in the estate of the donor for estate tax
purposes"' and the income from such gift is taxable to the donor."
Indeed, if such income is paid to a person other than the donor the
Commissioner contends that a gift of such income occurs.2"
2. JOINT TENANCIES AND GIFTS: TAX CONSIDERATIONS
Related to the subject of what constitutes gifts are joint tenancies.
Although joint tenancies have been abolished in Washington as part of
our property law,"' it is still possible to create joint tenancies by
contract, as in the case of bank accounts."1 " In addition, the Washing-
ton statutory law expressly authorizes joint bank accounts with right
of survivorshp2' 8 subject to inheritance and gift tax law' 1 No gift
210Revocable trusts may be desirable independently of tax considerations,
e.g., as a substitute for an agency or power of attorney, or for preservation of
continuity in business management notwithstanding trustor's death. REM. REv.
STAT. § 11218-11 (c), Reg. 108, § 86.3. C. I. R. v. Warner, 127 F (2d) 913 (C. C. A.
9th, 1942)
211 INT. REV. CODE § 1000 (d)
212 Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176, 87 L. ed. 690, 63 Sup. Ct. 545 (1943)
218 Estate of Davis v. C. I. R., 5 T. C. (Dec. 11, 1946) (Trustee had power to
accelerate the remainder interests) See also C. I. R. v. Estate of Harry Holmes,
326 U. S. 480, 90 L. ed. 228, 66 Sup. Ct. 257 (1946), Estate of Bingham v. C. I. X,
7 T. C. No. 152; C. I. R. v. Newbold's Estate, 158 F. (2d) 694 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946),
Estate of Charles M. Thorp v. C. I. R., 7 T. C. 104 (1946), Estate of Milton J.
Budlong, 7 T. C. 90 (1946)
221 Income of a trust used to discharge a legal obligation of trustor is taxable
to trustor even though he has parted with all rights to the trust property.
Douglas v. Willcuts, 286 U. S. 1, 80 L. ed. 3, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935), Halvering
v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 87 L. ed. 154, 63 Sup. Ct. 140 (1942)
21 The Commissioner's contention has been rejected by the Tax Court, how.
ever. Hogle v. C. I. R., 7 T. C. No. 114 (Oct. 17, 1946); Strong v. C. I. X, 7 T. C.
No. 108 (1946), Rmu. Rv. STAT, § 11218-il (c)2 1 0 REm. REV. STAT. § 1344.
217 I re Ivers Estate, 4 Wn. (2d) 477, 104 P (2d) 467 (1940) See Crutcher,
Surrvorshtp %n Joint Bank Accounts and Wilson v. Ivers (1941) 16 WASi. L. REV.
105; Tacoma Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Nadham, 14 Wn. (2d) 576, 128 P (2d) 982 (1942)
,18 REm. REV. STAT. § 3348 (Mutual Savings Banks), § 3717-41 (Building and
Loan Assn.), §§ 3249, 3249-1, 3249-2 (National, State Bank, and Trust Company)
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occurs when community property bank account is placed in a joint
tenancy nor when the separate property of one is so placed.2 0 The gift
would seem to occur, however, when and to the extent of the amount
withdrawn by the person who has contributed nothing thereto.21 In
the case of community property, a gift should be deemed to occur when
either party withdraws more than his or her one-half of the account.22
The same would seem to be true, in the absence of local statute, in the
case of jointly owned war and defense savings bonds.2 8 No gift for
federal tax purposes occurs until the bonds are redeemed and the
proceeds retained.2 2 ' Beneficiary registration alone in such case does
not create the gift.2 However, if donor is not a joint payee the gift
occurs on registration and delivery 2 8
Where one person places Ins or her property (separate or com-
munity) in joint tenancy with another, with right of survivorsip,
which rights may be defeated by either party severing his interest, a
taxable gift then occurs. " If a tenancy by entirety is created by either
spouse the gift is measured by the value of property placed in tenancy
by entirety, less the donor's right to the income therefrom during the
joint lives of the spouses and Ins right to take the whole on survivorsnp,
using life expectancy tables as an aid. 28 However,jointly held property
(as well as property held by entireties or community property) is
taxable in full in the estate of the one first to die except such part as
belonged to the other person and was not received as a gift from the
32' Id. § 11201 (Inheritance Tax); § 11218-11 (Gift Tax) does not deal speci-
fically with bank accounts, but to the extent a gift is involved, gift tax statutes
apply.
220 Wolfe v. Hoefke, 124 Wash. 495, 214 Pac. 1047 (1923); Meyers v. Albert, 76
Wash. 218, 135 Pac. 1003 (1913) Cf. The Old Nat. Bk. & Union Trust Co. v.
Kendall, 14 Wn. (2d) 19, 126 P (2d) 603 (1942)
22 This is unplicit in the Washington decisions. See Daly v. Pacific Say. &
Loan Assn., 154 Wash. 249, 282 Pac. 80 (1929) It is the federal ruling. Reg. 108,
S86.2 (4). 1
22 This conclusion follows from the nature of spouses' interests in community
property.
223 REMv. REV. STAT. §§ 11548-80, 61.
2' Min. 5202, 1941-2 C. B. 241, reported at C. C. H. supra note 202, § 3391.909.
For local law purposes, however, the gift is complete at latest upon death of a
co-owner. Wash. Laws 1943, c. 14.
'2 Note 224, supra,
822 Under state law (Div. v. Chamberlan's Estate, 21 Wn. (2d) 790, 153 P. (2d)
305 (1944), and federal law. (Note 224, supra.)
27Reg. 105, § 86.2 (a) (5).
22 Reg. 108, § 86.2(), 86.19(h).
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decedent, " regardless of the gift tax, if any, previously paid.3 0
Joint tenancy with right of survivorship has undesirable tax conse-
quences. It is true that like community property income, joint tenancy
income during the joint lives of the joint tenants"' and losses may be
equally divided both for ordinary income and capital gain purposes.23 -
The whole of property jointly held is includable in the estate of the
joint tenant first to die33 (with credit for gift tax previously paid)2 3.
and if the second joint tenant dies more than five years thereafter "
the whole of the property which the joint tenant owns by right of sur-
vivorship is taxed again.23 ' Furthermore, the cost basis of property
jointly held in the case of the surviving joint tenant is the cost basis
of decedent donor, or fair market value at date of gift, whichever is
lesser,237 rather than the fair cash market value at the date of death."
Furthermore, jointly held property does not eliminate state inheritance
taxation3. and if debts exceed deceased's property, debts are not
deductible to the extent of such excess.' Tenancy in common or com-
229 INT, REV. CODE § 811 (e), Reg. 105, § 81.2 as amended T. D. 5239 (March 10,
1943), RE.r. RE., STAT. § 11201.
2 3 0 ABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INcoME, GIFr AND ESTATE TAxATIoN, E 4, § 6, p.
298; Reg. 108, §§ 86.2 and 86.19 (h)
231 Edmonds v. C. I. R., 90 F (2d) 14, cert. denied, 302 U. S. 713, 82 L. ed. 551,
58 Sup. Ct. 32 (1937)
23 Alfred Hafner 31 B. T. A. 338 (1934), Geo. K. Brennan v. C. I. R., 4 T. C.
1260 (1945), Sandberg v. C. I. R., 8 T. C. No. 52 (1947) The same rule is ap-
plicable to income from property held by tenants by the entirety I. T. 3783, I. R. B.
1946-3.12238.
23 IN T. REV. CODE § 811(e), Reg. 105, § 81.22 as amended by T. D. § 5239 (March
10, 1943), REM. REV. STAT. § 11201; Wash. Laws 1937 c. 108. This applies to U. S.
savings, defense and war bonds. Mim. 5202, 1941-2 C. B. 241. C. C. H. FED. ESTATE
& Gnr TAX REP. § 3391-909. See Hausfelder v. Security First Nat. Bank, 176
P (2d) 84, (Cal. App. 1946)
28 IN'T. REV. CODE § 936 (b), Reg. 105, § 81.8 (b), Win. H. Homer Est., 44 B. T. A.
1136 (1941), affd. 130 F (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) (whether gift tax is paid by
decedent or another)
2s IixrT. REV. CODE § 812 (c); Reg. 105, § 81.41 (a) (1), the status means five years
between the deaths, not between the estate distributions. Second Natl. Bank &
Tr. Co. v C. I. R., 63 F (2d) 815 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) REm. REV. STAT. § 11202-a
limits the exemption to transfers within a limited class of persons, including
spouses and children. This is not true under the federal act.
26 INT. REV. CODE § 811. Surviving tenant doesn't take by "bequest, devise,
or inheritance" as required by § 113 (a) (5)
287 Carpenter v C. I. R., 27 B. T. A. 282 app. dis., 68 F (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 7th,
1934), INT. RED CODE § 113 Ca) (2)
230 INT. REV, CODE § 113 (a) (5)
:3 REM. REV. STAT. § 11201; Wash. Laws 1937 c. 108 § 1.
340 See Bascom Little Estate, B. T. A. Memo. Dock. 112651, C. C. H. 13, 174;
INT. REV. CODE § 812 (b) as amended Rev. Act. 1942 § 405 (a)
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munity property interests are, however, includable in the estate and
hence permit debt deduction pro tanto.'
3. GIFTS WITH PERMISSIBLE STRINGS
a. GIFTS IN TRUST: TAX PROBLEMS
It must not be thought, however, that the gift must be entirely with-
out strings. Certain strings are permissible. A gift in trust, if the trust
is irrevocable, is still a taxable gift even though possession free of the
trust is postponed to a future date.242 It should be pointed out, how-
ever, that such transfer may constitute a future interest and hence not
qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion of $3,ooo.2" Thus a gift in
trust to a trustee for the benefit of a minor until he becomes of age
is gift of a future interest,24 but such a gift with provision for annual
disbursements of income is not a gift of a future interest.2 " Further-
more, a gift in trust with a right of reversion in the donor is a permis-
sible gift qualifying both for purposes of annual exclusion and gift
tax exemption.48
Gifts in trust may, however, raise important income tax questions
under Sections 22(a), 166 and 167 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Those sections have been frequently and successfully invoked under
the doctrine of Helvering v. Clifford, Commissioner,47 to permit the
donor to be taxed on the trust income (even though the gift is subject
to gift tax)248 on the theory that the donor or his subservient trustee has
retained such controls over the trust that in effect the donor is still the
owner. Such controls include reservation of management powers for
261 INT. REV. CODE § 811 (e) (2); Estate of L A. Smith v. C. I. R., 45 B. T. A. 59
(1941) For a recent discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages
taxw2se of joint tenancies, see Dane, Tenances, Jotnt or Common and by the
Entirettes (July, 1947) 25 TAXEs-TE TAx MAGAZDiE 634.
2
'2 Reg. 108, § 86.3; Lasker v. C. I. R., 1 T. C. 208 (1942)
2,3 LN. REV. CODE § 1003; Reg. 108, § 86.11; notes 176-7 supra.
2" Fondren v. C. I. R., 324 U. S. 18, 89 L. ed. 668, 65 Sup. Ct. 499 (1945);
C. I. R. v. Disston, 325 U. S. 442, 89 L. ed. 1397, 65 Sup. Ct. 1328 (1945); Schumacher
v. C. I. R., 8 T. C. No. 56 (1947)
'"C. I. R. v. Sharp, 153 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 9th, 1946)
216 Gifts in trust are excluded from the benefits of the annual exclusion from
1939 through 1942. INT. REV. CODE § 1003. Mere existence of reversionary interest
doesn't prevent a transfer from qualifying as a taxable gift, the value of the
reversionary interest being excluded. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176, 87 L.
ed. 690, 63 Sup. Ct. 545 (1943)
217 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 84 L. ed. 788, 60 Sup. Ct. 554 (1940)
2,8 Lockhard v. C. I. R., 7 T. C. No. 135 (1946)
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the donor's own benefit 4" or the reservation of power to shift income
or principal as among beneficiaries either in connection or not in con-
nection with a short-term trust."' The decisions have been in such
confusion as to what constituted a Section 22 (a) trust with resulting
income tax liability to the donor that finally the Treasury Depart-
ment, on December 29, 1945, promulgated Treasury Decision No.
5488, effective December 3, 1945,"l laying down definite though
somewhat arbitrary rules to guide the taxpayer in a determination of
the question.252 The rules were subjected to much criticism as being
too restricting"' with the result that the rules have been amended to
permit more trusts to qualify so as to free the donor from income
tax liability on trust income.2"' It is, therefore, now possible to create
a gift in trust for a minor by complying with the above mentioned
Treasury Decisions so that the income from the trust will not be tax-
able to the trustor except to the extent actually used to discharge the
trustor's legal obligation to support and educate the minor.155 It is still
not possible, however, to create a gift in trust for the purpose of dis-
charging or being available to discharge the trustor's legal obligations
except as last mentioned even through the medium of a corporate
21'9 Joseloff v. C. I. R., 8 T. C. No. 24 (1947) Mere reservation of management
powers by settlor-trustee is not ordinarily enough to render § 22A applicable.
Hemphill v. C. I. R., 8 T. C. No. 29 (Jan. 31, 1947), Loew v. C. I. R., 7 T. C. 43
(July 12, 1946), see annotation 166 A. L. R. 1308 (1945) See, however, Stock-
strom v. C. I. R., 7 T. C. No. 32 (1946) For a review of effect of power of man-
agement, see Naylor, Federal Tax Effects of Powers of Management and Control
Over Trust Investments (1918) 12 ILL. L. REV, 508-25. Cf. McKay v. C. I. R., 8 T. C.
No. 97 (1947) involving taxability of trust income under § 22A to trustee bene-
ficiary under trust created by beneficiary's parents.
:so Hopkins v. C. I. R., 157 F (2d) 679 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946)
,'Reg. 111 § 29.22 (a) -21.
22 The three general determinative factors considered are (1) reversionary
interest, (2) power to dispose of beneficial en3oyment, (3) powers of adminstra-
tive control.
' 
5 Pavendstedt, The Treasury Legtslates: The Distortion of the Clifford Rule
(1946) 2 TAx L. REv. 7; Lynch, Federal Income Taxes-The Treasury Interprets
the Clifford Case (1946) 15 FoPDHAm L. Rrv., 161-190; Eisenstem, The Clifford
Regulations and The Heavenly City of Legislative Intention (1947) 2 TAx L. REV.
327.
"'Treasury Dept. Release Dec. 26, 1946. For summary of proposed changes,
see (1947) 33 A. B. A. J. 294. In Mimeograph 6071, the Treasury stated that the
release of Clifford trust powers so as to make the trust conform to T. D. 5488
prior to Jan. 1, 1947 would render 1946 income non-taxable to the trustor. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue announced the changes July 2, 1947.
2 If principal of the trust is actually used, the trust income for that year
taxable to grantor to extent not paid out or credited to beneficiary. G. C. M.
24946 interpreting 1943 Rev. Act. § 167(c)
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trustee. Thus, a trust to provide funds with which to pay insurance
premiums for the benefit of the donor,8 or to pay the donor's debts,87
or to support, maintain and educate his children to the extent used 8
would result in income tax liability on the trust income to the donor." 9
b. GIFTS WITH POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER
Gifts in trust, even though the trust is irrevocable, frequently pro-
vide for right of reversion in the donor. Such trusts raise gift tax, in-
come tax and estate tax questions.
If a right of reverter exists and has value, the gift is complete for
gift tax purposes, the value of the right of reverter being deducted in
determining the value of the property being given away 28I If such right
of reverter exists, even though the possibility of reverter be remote, the
law prior to May 1, 1946, required the entire trust estate to be inven-
toned in and taxed as part of the trustor's estate for estate tax pur-
poses as a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
is death. 8' Due to much criticism, the Treasury Department pro-
mulgated Treasury Decision No. 3513, effective May i, 1946, attempt-
ing to lay down rules for the guidance of taxpayers who create gifts in
288 INT. REV. CODE § 167 (a) (3) Foster, 8 T. C. No. 22 (1947) Cf. C. I. R. v.
Jergens, 127 F (2d) 973 (1942) The rule is otherwise if the policy is payable to
a charity. If the trust income is payable to trustor's wife and he suggests she
use the trust income to pay insurance premiums on policy insuring husband's
life, the trust income is taxable to husband. Dunning v. C. I. R., 36 B. T. A. 1222
(1937). But if wife does so without suggestion from the husband, as where she
did so before and after the creation of the trust, husband was held not taxable
on trust income (Hexter v. C. I. R., 47 B. T. A. 483 (1942)); or where the sug-
gestion and decision was wholly that of the wife (Booth v. C. I. R., 3 T. C. 605
(1944)); or where wife voluntarily, without any agreement with the husband,
paid the prennums, the trust income was not taxable to the husband (Barker,
T. C. Memo. (Sept. 9, 1943))
251 INT. REV, CODE §§ 166, 167, 22A.
8 IZd. § 167(c).
210 For a short summary of the history of the use of the trust device to reduce
federal income taxes, see RANDOLPH E. PAuL, TAXATION FOR PROsPERrY, 293-296.
200 Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176, 87 L. ed. 690, 6 -Sup. Ct. 545 (1943)
201 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 84 L. ed. 604, 60 Sup. Ct. 444, 125 A. L. R.
1368 (1940) C. I. R. v. Estate of Spiegel (C. C. A. 7th, Dec. 28, 1946), Inclusion
zn Gross Estate of Trust Property zn Whch Benefcial Life IZnterest or Possibiity
of Reverter Is Reserved in Settlor (1947) 31 Mnn. L. REv. 278; reverters by
operation of law wuch are only remotely possible will support the Estate Tax.
Contra: Estate of Hughes v. C. I. R., 7 T. C. No. 157 (1946) The matter will
probably be settled shortly by the Supreme Court. See C. C. H., FEDERAL ESTATE
Am GiFT TAX RLe., No. 24, dated June 24, 1947. C. I. R. v. Bayne's Estate,
155 F. (2d) 475 ( C. C. A. 2d, 1946); C. 1. R. v. Bank of California, 155 F (2d)
1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1946), cert. denied; Beath v. Busey, Collector, 156 F.(2d)
496 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946); Thomas v. Graham. 158 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946)
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trust with a right of reverter. -2 - In general, no part of the trust estate
containing such right of reverter will be includable for estate tax pur-
poses in the donor's estate unless possession or enjoyment of the trans-
ferred interest can be obtained only by the beneficiaries who must sur-
vive the decedent and the decedent or his estate possesses any right
in the property In other words, a reversion contingent on the grantor's
death is includable, but a reversion contingent on a beneficiary's death
is not includable.26
A gift in trust with right of reverter also raises income tax questions,
because the existence of such right may result in a determination that
the grantor is the "owner" of the trust property under Section 22 (a)
of the Internal Revenue Code.2" However, the existence of a mere
right of reverter prior to Treasury Decision No. 5488 without more is
not enough to render the trust income taxable to the grantor.2-6
4. QUASI-TESTAMfENTARY GIFTS
From what has heretofore been said, it follows that any plan of
estate division that contemplates the use of gifts requires that such
gifts in general be by gift absolute, but if in trust that the trust be ir-
revocable and unamendable, that it comply with Treasury Decision No.
5488 for income tax purposes, comply with Treasury Decision No. 5513
for estate tax purposes, and if the annual exclusion of $3,000 is to be
obtained, that the gift does not create a future interest.
Certain additional principles in connection with gifts should, how-
ever, be borne in mind. One purpose of such gifts is to avoid their
In case of insurance proceeds, a mere right of reverter as to decedents dying
after Oct. 21, 1942 is not enough to render the proceeds includable in decedents'
gross estate. Rev. Act 1942, § 404 (a) See Estate of Hock v. C. I. R., 152 F (2d) 574
(C. C. A. 8th, 1946)
2'2 Reg. 108, § 81.17, amended by T. D. 5512; RA xnN & JoHNsoN, FEDERAL IxcOME,
GiFT AND TAXATION, G. 5, § 8, p. 3337. See Nelson, The New Reverter Regulations
(Sept., 1946) 24 TAXEs-TH TAX IVIAGAZINE, 848.
28, See note 282 supra. The Tax Court refused to apply this test in Hughes
Estate v. C. I. R., 7 T. C. No. 157 (1946) with respect to a pre-1931 inter vzvos
trust involving a contingent reversion by operation of law. Contra, C. I. R. v.
Spiegel Estate, C. C. A. 7th, Dec. 18, 1946. The American Bar Ass'n has recom-
mended a statutory amendment which would tax all reversionary interests at their
actuarial value in event of death. (1947) 33 A. B. A. J., No. 2, p. 171. See C. I. R.
v. Nathan, 159 F (2d) 546 (C. C. A. 7th, 1947) For gift tax purposes, the tax is on
the gift less the value of the right of reverter actuarily computed. Smith v
Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176, 87 L. ed. 690, 63 Sup. Ct. 545 (1943)
214 As construed in Helvering v. Clifford, note 247 supra.
265 Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S. 344, 84 L. ed. 796, 60 Sup. Ct. 551 (1940) Under
T. D. § 5488 reversionary rights may alone be sufficient.
ESTATE PLANNING
inclusion in the estate of the donor for inheritance and estate tax pur-
poses. It is, therefore, necessary to briefly notice statutory attempts
to defeat what may be termed quasi-testamentary nter vzvos transfers,
namely, gifts in contemplation of death, transfers intended to make
or take effect in possesion or enjoyment at or after death and whether
or not in trust, transfers with life income or possession retained, re-
vocable trusts and powers of appointment.
a. GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
Gifts or transfers (to the extent that they are not for money or
money's worth) in contemplation of death are subject to gift tax but are
includable in the donor's estate for estate26 and inheritance tax pur-
poses" '6 although with credit given for federal estate tax purposes for
gift tax paid.268 The amount of the gift tax is not, however, subject to
the inheritance or estate tax and hence a gift in contemplation of death
will still effect an inheritance or estate tax saving by the amount of the
tax otherwise payable on the gift tax paid or payable.6 " The phrase "in
contemplation of death" does not mean the general expectation of
death common to all men, but rather a gift prompted by the thought of
death. "7  The finding of the Tax Court on such a matter is final. 71
In deterumning whether a gift is in contemplation of death, the
age and health of the donor will be considered;2 2 his motives will
be inquired into in order to determine whether, the motives were associ-
ated with life" ' or with death."' Fundamentally, the inquiry should be
288 INT. REV. CODE § 811 (C); Reg. 105, § 81.16. 267 RMV REV. STAT. § 11201.
28 INT. REV. CODE § 813 (a) There is no corresponding statute in Washington.
See Rzvr. REv. STAT. § 11201, although unpaid gift tax would seem to be deductible
as a "debt."
0 For an illustration of such a possible tax saving, see I TAX L. REv. 33,
stating 'In the case of a five million dollar estate, half of which was transferred
in contemplation of death, the saving, at present rates would amount to approxi-
mately $500,000."2ToReg. 105, § 81.16.
71 Buckminster Estate v. C. I. R., 147 F. (2d) 331 (1944), Kroeger Estate v. C.I.R.
145 F (2d) 901 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 866, 89 L. ed. 1419, 65 Sup. Ct. 915
(1945)
272Fack v. Holtegel, 93 F.(2d) 512 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) Cf. Blakeslee v.
Smith, 110 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) wherein decedent was unaware of his
poor health.
273 E.g., to teach children how to handle money; to enable children to main-
tam their social position; to induce children to enter into business with parents;
to provide a wife with an independent income; to save income taxes; to relin-
quish active control of a business so as to lead. a life of ease; to protect one's
family from financial worry; to free donor from burdens of unproductive
property. See C. C. H. FED. ESTATE & Gint TAX REPORTER, § 3423.42.
271 See U. S. v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 75 L. ed. 867, 51 Sup. Ct. 446 (1931)
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directed to the issue of whether the gift was intended as a substitute for
a testamentary disposition.""5 However, the motive to avoid estate taxes,
as evidenced by an estate plan should not render the transfer subject to
estate tax,"' although the Comnnssioner contends that it should, and
the cases are divided.27 ' If the transfer was within two years prior to
death, both the federal ' and Washington law279 create a presumption
that it was in contemplation of death.
Transfers in contemplation of death, as in the case of gifts, are not
limited to the conventional situations of money or tangible property
transfers. Thus they include gifts in trust.28° Relinquishment of
powers of appointment within two years prior to death are presumptiv-
ely in contemplation of death to the extent of the amount of each bene-
ficiary's interest in excess of $5,ooo."8i A division of community prop-
erty into separate property may be a transfer in contemplation of
death.282
b. TRANSFERS INTENDED TO TAKE EFFECT IN POSSESSION OR
ENJOYMENT AT OR AFTER DEATH AND WHETHER OR NOT
IN TRUST.
A second type of transfer subject to estate and inheritance taxation
is a transfer (in trust or otherwise) by decendent prior to death, in-
tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death.88
275 INT. REV. CODE § 811 (c), Reg. 105, § 81.16; see Worcestor County Trust Co.
Ex'r v U. S., 35 Fed. Supp. 970 (D. C. Mass. 1940)
2,0 See Allen v. Trust Co. of Ga., 326 U. S. 630, 90 L. ed. 367, 86 Sup. Ct. 389
(1946), Re Denniston, 106 F (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) The matter is dis-
cussed by Cleary, Protecting the Family Through Estate Plcanrtg (June, 1947)
25 TAXEs-THE TAX MAGAZINE 543.
271 See C. C. H. FED. EsT. & GI=T TAX REPORTER, § 3423.10. Applies to a "transfer
of a material part of his property in the nature of a final disposition "
218 INT. REV. CODE § 811 (C) "except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth."
27, REw. Rav. STAT. § 11201(a) applies regardless of whether the form of the
transfer be by "deed, grant, sale or gift without a valid and adequate con-
sideration therefor."
260 In Colorado Natl. Bank v. C. I. R., 305 U. S. 23, 83 L. ed. 20, 59 Sup. Ct. 48
(1938) the court held the facts did not warrant the gift m trust being held in
contemplation of death.
2 81 INT. REV. CODE § 811 (d) (4) Relinquishment of power to amend a trust of
life insurance policies has been held to be in contemplation of death. Louis
Diamond Estate v. C. I. R., 159 F (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 2d, 1947)
282 INT. REV. CODE § 811 (d) (5) Estate of A. P Humphrey, T. C. M., Dec. No.
14958 (Mem.), Reg. 108, § 86.2(c) set out in C. C. H. INHEeaTAxcE, ESTATE & GIFT
TAX REPORTER § 3935.
:83 INT. REV. CODE § 811 (c), Reg. 105, § 81.17 renders such transfers includable in
estate if possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest can be obtained
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This, likewise, does not apply to transfers for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth.2'
c. TRANSFERS WITH LIFE INCOME OR POSSESSION RETAINED
A third type of transfer is one with life income or possession retain-
ed other than a transfer for full and adequate consideration.285 Al-
though the remainder interest is subject to a gift tax, 8 the entire trust
estate is includable in the donor's estate at death."'
The husband's right of management in a community property estate
with respect to community property transferred to a wife is not the
possession or enjoyment contemplated by the statute so as to be in-
cludable in the husband's estate under the Pre-1942 Revenue Act.288
The right to possession or enjoyment may exist from a consideration of
all the controls retained, e.g., the right to fix salary as president of
corporation and vote stock thereof transferred in trust, 8 or other
economic benefit.190 Contingent right to income has been held insuffic-
ient to render property includable in decedent's estate. 91 Power to
only by beneficiaries who must survive the decedent and the decedent or his
estate possesses any right or interest in the property. Hence, if decedent in his
lifetime transfers such retained interest to a charity, no interest would be
retained, and the transfer would not be includable for estate tax purposes. The
For inheritance tax.liability, see Rmv- REv. STAT. § 11201.
a' INT. REV. CODE § 811(c); Rm. REv. STAT. §§ 11201, 11201(a)
288 INT. REv. CODE § 811 (c) effective March 8, 1931. See Reg. 105, § 81.18. Prior
.thereto, it was held in May v. Hemer, 281 U. S. 288, 74 L. ed. 826, 50 Sup. Ct. 286
(1930) that mere retention of life income from the trust by grantor was msuffi-
cient to require value of trust property to be included in grantor's estate. See
also, Drummond v. Clauson, 67 F. Supp. 872 (U. S. D. C., Mar. 1946) The right
to have income applied in discharge of settior's continuing obligations is the
equivalent of retention of income. Helvermg v. Mercantile Commerce Bank &
Tr. Co., 111 F. (2d) 224 (1940) cert. denied, 310 U. S. 654, 84 L. ed. 148, 60 Sup.
Ct. 1104 (1940) (income to wife to be used for family expenses, her support)
For inheritance tax liability see Rnv. REv. STAT. § 11201.
288 C. I. R. v. Proctor, 142 F (2d) 824 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944)
2 87 IN. REV. CODE § 811 (c) However, if the interest reserved is contingent upon
the grantor surviving the beneficiary the Tax Court has held that the trust
property is not includable. Curie v. C. I. R., 4 T. C. 1175 (1945) The 1937 Reg-
ulations were contra. Reg. 80 (1937 Edition) Art. 18. In May v. Heiner, it was
indicated that it made no difference whether a present or future life estate was
retained. In C. I. R. v. Estate of Nathan, 159 F. (2d) 546 (C. C. A. 7th, 1947) it
was held, reversing the Tax Court, that even a contingent life estate rendered
the trust property includable under INT. Rzv. CODE § 811(c)288 U. S. v. Goodyear, 99 F. (2d) 523 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938)
888 Estate of Holland, 1 T. C. 564 (1943)
290 Porter v. C. I. R., 288 U. S. 426, 77 L. ed. 880, 53 Sup. Ct. 451 (1933) 2
NossAmAm, TRUST ADnNrsTRATIoN AND TAXATION § 633, p. 16. Cf. Income Tax
Liability, note 250.29i Estate of Charles Curie v. C. I. R., 4 T. C. 1175 (1945)
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control investments and to manage trust property may be reserved,
however,292 but not a power of invasion for settlor's benefit.29 The
statute cannot be circumvented by A making a gift to B, followed by
the creation of a trust for A's benefit as part of a plan,"" or by cross-
trusts, as where A and B create trusts similar in terms, for each other's
benefit or with reciprocal rights of terunation."'
d. REVOCABLE TRUSTS
Property held under a revocable trust at the date of trustor's death
is part of his taxable estate.29 Power of settlor trustee to invade corpus
or accumulated income for his wife, trust beneficiary, renders the
trust a revocable one.297
e. POWER OF APPOINTMENT
A fifth type of -nter vzvos transfer that should be noticed here is
the power of appointment. In general, the power of appointment is
the power or authority to designate what persons should enjoy the
ownership of the property not belonging to the donee of the power.
Thus, a father may transfer property to a son for life, coupled with a
power in the son to designate who shall take the remaining property
after the son's death, or the transfer may be one whereby property
is transferred for a term of years, coupled with a power in the son to
designate who shall take the remaining property after the end of the
term.
Powers of appointment do not have the same tax treatment by the
state and federal governments. Under the state law, the exercise of a
power of appointment by a donee is a transfer subject to inheritance
tax as if the donee owned the property bequeathed, unless the donee
was a non-resident and the donor a resident at the time the appoint-
292 Remecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 73 L. ed. 410, 49 Sup. Ct.
123 (1929)
293 Blunt v. Kelly, 131 F (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), Estate of Gallois v.
C. I. R., 4 T. C. 840 (1945)
294 Richardson v. Smith, 102 F (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) See Re Schah's
Estate, 66 Mont. 50, 212 Pac. 516 (1923), Miller's Estate, 236 N. Y. 290, 140 N. E.
701 (1923)
295 INT. REV. CODE § 811 (c) (d) (i), Phillips v. Gmchtel, 27 F (2d) 662 (C. C. A.
3d, 1927) cert. denied, 278 U. S. 636 (1928), Lehman v. C. I. R., 109 F (2d) 99
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939) cert. denied, 310 U. S. 637 (1940) Note 151 A L R. 1142.
2916 Day v. C. I. R., 92 F (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1937), Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 73 L. ed. 410, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1929) Generally, see 2
NossA.A, TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATION, § 634, p. 18 et seq.
201 Perrm Estate, C. C. H., Dec. 13806 (Mere.) T. C. (1944)
2 8 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 318.
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ment takes effect, in which case the appointed property is taxable as
if it had been transferred by the donor."' For state gift tax purposes,
no express provision is made that the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment shall be treated as a gift by the donee of the power exercising
it." Under the federal law since the Revenue Act of 1942, taxable
powers of appointment are redefined both for gift tax and federal
estate tax purposes. Both for federal gift tax purposes and federal
estate tax purposes, a power of appointment means any power of ap-
pointment exercisable by an individual either alone or in conjunction
with any person8"' with certain exceptions, namely, familial powers of
appointment, 802 fidiciary powers, 08 and powers exercisable in favor of
specified charities.80' If a taxable power exists, its exercise or release
may be subject to a gift tax,0 ' and upon the death of the donee of the
power, the property subject to the power is includable in the estate of
the donee of such power"" unless meanwhile the power has been made,
created, exercised, or relinquished for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth.0 ' Property is also includable if the
power exists or is exercised or released in contemplation of death or by
disposition intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death."8
f. CONCLUSIONS AS TO GIFT TRANSFERS
In view of the State and Federal law certain factors should be borne
in mind in any plan of property division rnter vzvos: T. Inter vzvos
gifts enable estate and income tax savings to be effected through the
use of annual exclusions and gift ta~x exemptions and by virtue of the
219RizvL BEi. STAT. § 11201.c; State v. Dobson, 188 Wash. 211, 61 P (2d) 1302
(1936)
80 See note 481, znra.
'LINT. REV. CoDE §§ 1000(c), 811(f)
302Id. §§ 1000(c) (1), 811(f) (2) (A).
$031d. H 1000(a) (2), 811(f) (2) (B)
8
°'Id. § 812(d) as amended 1942 Rev. Act., § 403(b) (1), § 1004(a) (2)
305 8I, § 1000 (c)
s16 Zd. § 811 (f) (1) Ex'rs of Henderson v. Rogan, 159 F. (2d) 855 (C. C. A.
9th, 1947); Estate of Charles B. Ducharme, 7 T. C. 85 (1946), Penn. Co. v. U. S.
(D. C. Pa. 1946) (under pre-1942 law) However, unless the will of the deceased
otherwise directs, the executor may recover from the person receiving the
apportioned property, the estate tax attributable thereto, based on a specific
formula. MI-m. REV. CODE; see note 491, %nfra.0 7 INT, REV. CODE § 1002.
308 d. §§ 811(f) (1), 811(d) (4) This applies whether the powers were created
before or after October 21, 1942.. Prior to Rev. Act. of 1942 only property pass-
mg by the exercise of a general power of appointment was subject to the
Federal Estate Tax.
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fact that the tax base is reduced through estate splitting, and gift tax
rates are less than estate or inheritance tax rates.
2. Maximum savings can be effected if the gifts are outright and do
not create future interests in property 3. Gifts m trust may, however,
be made with tax savings, provided that care is taken to make them
complete and to have them comply with Treasury Decisions No. 5488
and No. 5513, so as to avoid income tax liability to the donor and
estate tax liability by virtue of rights of reverter. 4. If gifts in trust
are made to more than one beneficiary, separate gifts in trust should
be made in order to enable each trust to take advantage of the annual
income tax exemption of $ioo and to keep the trust income in the lower
income tax brackets. 5. Gifts of community property should take into
account the federal rule that such gifts are deemed gifts by the husband.
6. Division of community into separate property by an agreement of the
spouses may be desirable taxwise, but the matter should await further
clarification. 7 Joint ownership arrangements are not desirable in
Washington except for procedural purposes in connection with bank
accounts and war or defense savings bonds. 8. Any inter vzvos trans-
fers should take into account the statutory attempts to tax what may be
termed quasi-testamentary gifts, namely, gifts in contemplation of
death, transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death, transfers with life income or equivalent benefits or
possession retained, revocable gifts or trusts and powers of appoint-
ment. 9. Gifts which are complete for gift tax purposes may still re-
sult in income tax liability to the donor and estate tax liability to the
donor unless safeguarded in the manner hereinabove pointed out.
IV
DONATIVE INSURANCE AND ESTATE LIQUIDITY
A. ESTATE LIQUIDITY
It is obvious from the foregoing summary of estate problems that the
availability of cash in or to the estate is of the highest importance in
order to pay funeral expenses, debts, taxes, cash bequests, administra-
tive expenses, costs and fees. If cash is not available, estate assets may
have to be sold at a sacrifice with resulting capital loss and income
shrinkage. An estate with frozen and difficult-to-market assets (such
as stock in a closely held corporation, or real estate) may well be in a
very difficult position.
In any estate plan, provision should be made to meet this conting-
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ency Such provision could be made by seeing to it that the estate has
cash, bank deposits or marketable securities, insurance moneys through
personal or business insurance. In any case, the executor should be
empowered to borrow money for the payment of demands, obligations,
taxes, or administrative expenses, costs and fees.
In connection with the problem of estate liquidity, insurance may
play an important part. We, therefore, turn to a consideration of per-
sonal and business insurance problems.
B. LIFE INSURANCE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO FEDERAL
TAX LAW
Most persons interested in estate planmng have, or contemplate
having, life insurance, and, frequently, accident, health or hospital
insurance are obvious and need not detain us in connection with our
present inquiry
Under Washington law, life insurance policies are separate or com-
munity, depending upon the separate or community character of the
premiums paid.809 If such premiums are paid partly from separate and
partly from community property the proceeds are separate or com-
munity in that proportion that the kind of premium paid bears to the
entire premium cost of the policy "I
Under state law, life insurance proceeds up to $40,000 are exempt
from state inheritance tax if payable to persons other than the in-
sured's estate or for his benefit.81 They are likewise exempt from the
claims of creditors of the insured or beneficiary without limitation as
to amount if the policy is payable or is assigned to a person other than
the insured or the person effecting the insurance. 12 Under federal law,
life insurance proceeds, as such, are not exempt from estate tax. 18
39o In re Coffee's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P (2d) 283 (1938), Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P (2d) 27, 114 A. L. R. 531 (1937) A spouse
cannot give community property away. Hence, a husband cannot name as
beneficiary one other than his wife or his estate. In re Towey's Estate, 22 Wn. (2d)
212, 155 P (2d) 273 (1945) There is a rebuttable presumption of consent if the
beneficiary is a child, parent, brother or sister of either spouse, regardless of
size of policy. Wash. Laws 1947, c. 79, § 18.44(2)
10 In re Coffee's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P (2d) 283 (1938), Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P (2d) 27, 114 A. L. R. 531 (1937)
3'1 REw. REV. STAT. § 11211 (b) Beneficiaries may be trust benefciaries other
than insured's estate. In re Killien's Estate, 78 Wash. 335, 35 P (2d) 11 (1934)
012 Rm. REv. STAT. § 7230-1, Wash. Laws 1947, c. 79, § 18-40-1-2; § 18.43 adds
exemption in limited amount for annuities.
31 INT. REV. CODE § 811(e) (2); (g) (1) Prior to October 22, 1942 a $40,000
insurance proceeds exemption in case of policies payable to other than insured,
was allowed. § 811(g)
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Certain special rules should, however, be noted in that connection. If
the insurance proceeds are payable to the insured's estate or for his
benefit, they are, of course, subject to the estate tax. 1' If the proceeds
of the policy are payable to other beneficiaries, they may still be in-
cluded in his estate for estate tax purposes if at the time of his death
the decedent possessed any of the incidents of ownership with respect
thereto, either alone or in conjunction with another person."' A person
is said to possess an incident of ownership if the deceased at the time
of death owned the policy as community property or if he has any
rights under the policy, such as the right to the cash surrender value
or loan value, the right to change beneficiary, or any other right con-
ferred upon him by the policy 810 Even in the absence of such incident of
ownership, the proceeds of such a policy are included to the extent that
they are attributable to the premiums paid, directly or indirectly, by
the decedent."' The application of this premium test depends upon
whether the policies were transferred before or after January 1o, 1941.
If a policy has been transferred on or before January io, 1941, a
modified premium test is applicable, even though the decedent retain
none of the incidents of ownership in the policy "I If he paid no prem-
iums after January 1o, 1941, none of the proceeds is includable in the
insured's estate.1 9 If he paid part of the premiums after January io,
1941, the proceeds are includable in his estate m the proportion that
the insured's post-January io, 1941 payments bear to the total prem-
iums paid.2
If a policy has been transferred after January Io, 1941, the prem-
ium test is applicable even though the decedent retain none of the in-
cidents of ownership in the policy 8I Consequently, the entire proceeds
are includable in the insured's estate if he has paid all the premiums.
81, Id. § 811(e) (2), (g) (1)
215 Id. § 811 (e) (2), (g) (2) See Hodge, Life Insurance and the Estate Tax
(Apr'l, 1947) 25 TAXES-THE TAx 1AGAziNE, discussing znter alia the constitution-
ality of Iw. REV. CODE § 811 (g)
810 Reg. 105, § 81.27; see C. C. H. FEn. ESTATE & GiFT TAx REP. § 3473.36. Proceeds
of a group insurance policy held sub3ect to estate tax of decedent employee.
Welliver v. C. I. R., 8 T. C. 165. Dec. No. 15567 (Jan. 28, 1947) Incident of owner-
ship does not, however, include a mere right of reverter as to decedents dying
after October 21, 1942; Estate of Simmons v. C. I. R., 152 F (2d) 574 (C. C..
8th, 1946), INT. REV. CODE § 811 (g) (2)
817 Irr. REV. CODE § 811 (g) (2) (4)
818 Revenue Act of 1942, § 404 (c), 26 U. S. C. A. § 811 (g)
81 Ibid.
820 Ibid.
82 INT. REV. CODE § 811(g) (2) (3) amended 1942 Rev. Act § 404(c)
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If he has paid only part of the premiums, then the proceeds are in-
cludable in his estate in the proportion which the insured's payments
bear to the total premiums paid. The dates of the premium payments
are not material.
Certain rules should be noted with respect to insurance trusts. If
the trust is revocable, the proceeds are taxable under the incidents of
ownership test. If the trust is irrevocable and the insured has
retained no other incidents of ownership the proceeds are probably
taxable under the premium test as indirectly paid by the insured. 22
Since the premium test is applicable if a payment is made directly or
indirectly by the decedent in his lifetime, premiums paid by the trust,
whether from corpus or income, may properly be held to be indirect
payments by the trust or deceased. 88
Death payments under accident or health policies, or under the double
indemnity provisions of life insurance policies, are treated as the pro-
ceeds of ordinary life insurance.8 2"
In addition to the estate tax payable upon insurance proceeds, there
may be an income tax liability in the case of a purchaser of a policy
for a consideration. 25 If the policy has been transferred by way of
gift, no portion of the proceeds is subject to income tax,"' but if the
policy has been acquired for consideration the proceeds are subject to
income tax to the extent that they exceed such consideration, plus the
amount of subsequent premiums paid by the assignee.82 This rule does
not apply to gifts of policies which retain the transferor's basis. 88
Where proceeds are payable after death in installments, pursuant to a
settlement option exercised either by the beneficiary829 or insured,5 0
such installments are entirely exempt and no portion of the proceeds
322 This was also the prior law. Waldo Rohnert Estate, 40 B. T. A. 319 (1939)
323 See, however, Helvering v. Reybme, 83 F. (2d) 215 (1936) suggesting a dif-
ferent result.
82 Reg. 105, § 81.25.
82 Under mr. Rsv. CODE § 22 (b) (1) and § 22 (b) (1)-1 insurance proceeds are
exempt from income tax liability. Nor are premums paid for life insurance
deductible expenses; § 24(a) (1); § 29.24-1, §29.22(a)-12); see G. C. M. 10798,
C. B. XI-2, 58. However, the gain on assigned policies is taxable income, even
though insurance proceeds create the gain; INT. REv. CODS § 22(b) (2)
820 See, however, Hacker v. C. I. R., 36 B. T. A. 659 (1937)
321 INT. REv. CODE § 22 (b) (2) However, if the insured acquires the policy by
assignment for consideration, death proceeds are not taxable to the beneficiary.
I. T. 3212, C. B. 1938.2, 65.
828 See Income Tax Ruling 3212, 2 Cum. Burz. (C. C. H., 1938) 65.
320 Pierce v. C. I. R., 2 T. C. 832, affirmed 146 F (2d) 388 (1944)
SSO Reg. 111, § 29.22(b) (1)-1 as amended by T. D. 5231 (Feb. 23, 1943)
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is reportable as income. If, however, the entire face amount is retained
by the insurance company, the annual interest received by the bene-
ficiary is taxable income. '
If an insured makes a gift of a policy by assignment or otherwise,
the transfer is subject to gift tax. "' The subsequent payment by the
insured of the premiums on such a policy will also create gift tax li-
ability 88 Despite the gift, the insurance proceeds, in whole or in part,
will be included in the insured's estate under the premium test .31
The necessity of providing for liquidity of an estate in order to meet
tax and administration expenses suggests the necessity of doing so
without at the same time augmenting the base on which the inherit-
ance or estate tax will be computed. Thus, if the policy were paid to
the insured's estate, the proceeds would augment the base, and the
estate and inheritance tax would be increased by reason thereof."' On
the other hand, if the insurance policy were made payable to a bene-
ficiary other than the insured, there would be available $40,000 inherit-
ance tax-exempt insurance,88 and if the insured did not retain either
the incidents of ownership and if he were not subject to the premium
test the insurance proceeds would not be taxable for federal estate tax
purposes.8 ' For example, if a policy were transferred on or before
January io, 1941, and the insured paid no premiums thereafter, the
33% U. S. v. Heibroner, 100 F (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) Likewise, payment in
excess of stipulated installments, representing excess interest or dividends, are
subject to income tax. C. I. R. v. Winslow, 113 F (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940),
C. I. R. v Bartlett, 113 F (2d) 766 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940)
382 Reg. 108, § 85.2 (a) (8) Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U. S. 254, 85 L. ed. 813,
61 Sup. Ct. 507 (1941), Ryerson v. U. S., 312 U. S. 405, 85 L. ed. 917, 61 Sup. Ct.
656 (1941) If insured retains a reversionary interest (as where he assigns the
policy to his wife and upon her death to her children, but upon their death to
his estate) the reversionary interest may result in the full value of the policy
being taxable in donor's estate as to decedent's dying before October 22, 1942.
Estate of Thierot, 7 T. C. 1119 (1946) Cf. note 261 supra. The assignment may
easily constitute a transfer in contemplation of death. Cronin v. C. I. R., 7 T. C.
1403 (1946), Ex'rs of Flick v. C. I. R., 5 T. C. M., Jan. 30, 1947; Estate of Diamond v.
C. I. R., 159 F (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 2d, 1947)
ass Reg. 108, § 86.2(a) (8) Donor may make a gift of initial or subsequent
premiums gift tax free up to $3,000 per year, as well as the federal lifetime
exemption of $30,000. See note 171 et seq. supra.
834 INr. BPv. ACT § 811(g) (2) (3), amended 1942 Rev. Act § 404 (c)
83 Id. § 811 (e) (2), (g) (1), RBmr. REv. STAT § 11211 (b) An tnter vtvos gift in
an amount equal to the insurance proceeds may be used as an offset to the
increased estate tax resulting from the inclusion of insurance proceeds in the
estate tax base.
3a6 Ri, REv. STAT. § 11211 (b)
37 IN T. REv. ACT § 811 (e) (2); (g) (2); (g) (4)
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insured upon his death would not have any incidents of ownership in
the policy and would have paid no premiums after January io, 1941,
and accordingly none of the procdeds would be includable in his
estate.81s In such a case, likewise, if such a transfer were without con-
sideration, the proceeds would not be subject to income tax liability,"8
even though at the time of the transfer they might have been subject to
gift tax liability, unless within the annual exclusion of $3,000 or the
lifetime exemption of $30,000.8 o
However, in planning an estate now, the January zo, 1941 date is
no longer available for use. Consequently, it becomes necessary to
ascertain if it is possible to work out a plan that will enable the use
of life insurance proceeds without augmenting the tax base. The fol-
lowing is suggested:
A beneficiary heir can take out a life insurance policy upon the
donor, such beneficiary heir paying all the premiums therof. Upon the
death of the donor, the beneficiary then will have life insurance pro-
ceeds available with which to either purchase, frozen assets from the
estate or with which to lend to the estate to enable the estate to pay off
its obligations. In that way the insurance proceeds are used by the
estate but without augmenting the estate base. Another variation of
this plan is to have the beneficiary take out such insurance under a
trust arrangement whereby the trustee is authorized to attend to the
details of buying out frozen assets of the estate or lending it money and
thereby accomplishing the same result.81 If the donor takes out the
insurance, naming a beneficiary other than himself, or naming a trus-
tee, with instructions to use the proceeds to purchase estate assets or
to lend money to the estate, this plan will not work, because the donor
in such a case at the time of his death either has the incidents of owner-
ship, or has paid the premiums so as to become subject to the premium
test, or both."'8 Consequently, the insurance proceeds program, while
economically justifiable, does not accomplish any tax savings.
Furthermore, in any system of estate planning it is necessary to
integrate the payment of the insurance proceeds with the distribution
s8 Rev. Act. 1942, § 404(c), 26 U. S. C. A., § 811(9)
'
88 Only transfers for consideration create income tax liability.
8
'
0Reg. 108, § 86.2(a) (8); INW. REV, CODE §§ 1003(b) (3), 1004(a) (1)
8
' PBXnU AND JomsoN, FEDERAL INCOME, GnTAND ESTATE TAXATIoN (1942)
3636, § 7.
s'2INT. REv. CODE. §§ 811(e) (2), (g) (2) (4)
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to be effected by the will. '48 For example, if the insured elects an in-
stallment payment option, he should be sure that the amount payable
is taken into account in connection with any sums payable under the
terms of any testamentary trust that he creates under his will. Thus,
it can be provided that the payments payable under a testamentary
trust shall not exceed a stipulated amount, taking into account the in-
surance installment payments-or, if that is not desired, that the
amounts payable under the insurance policy shall not be considered
in determining the amount payable under the testamentary trust.
Again, in view of the fact that under the federal and state law both, the
additional inheritance and estate tax payable by reason of the inclusion
in the estate of insurance proceeds may be subsequentlly recovered
from the insurance beneficiary, this may have the effect of either re-
quiring a lump sum payment to be made by the beneficiary in advance
of the receipt of insurance proceeds by installments, or it may require
a deduction pro rata from the insurance installments of the tax pay-
able."4 ' If this is not desired, affirmative provision should be included
m the will to the effect that the personal representative shall not claim
any reimbursement from such insurance beneficiaries."' Sometimes,
it is desirable that the tax should be paid from the insurance proceeds,
because the return on insurance proceeds is usually much less than can
be obtained from trust investment. In that case, if nothing is said in
the will, the tax will be paid from the insurance proceeds.8 4
C. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
Related to the problem of personal insurance, account should be
taken of the benefits available under the Social Security Act. The
benefits payable thereunder to wage-earners in private industry and
business in "covered employment" are of two types: retirement bene-
fits and survivor's benefits. In general, monthly retirement benefits
are payable to the wage-earner when he is 65 or older and stops work;
34, Personal life insurance can be made payable tnter aia (1) in lump sum
to a named beneficiary, or to the personal representative of the insured; (2)
under settlement options for interest income purposes or fixed installment
payment purposes; (3) or to a trustee under a life insurance trust with more
flexible powers than is possible by use of settlement options, especially where
more than one insurance company is involved, when policies contain dissimilar
settlement options.
3,, See Polisher, Prorating of Federal Estate Tax Aiong Life Insurance Bene-
ji anes (1945) 50 Dxcx. L. Rrv. 1-6, discussing In re Scott's Estate, 286 N. Y. S.
138, 293 N. Y. S. 126 (1936) and Mariland's Estate, 351 Pa. 623, 42 A. (2d) 63 (1945)
:,5 INT. REV. CODE § 826 (c), Reg. 105, § 81.84.
846 Ibd.
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to Ins wife when she is 65; and to his unmarried children until the age
of z8.1"' To qualify for these benefits, a worker must be "fully insured"
-that is, must have worked in a covered job approximately half the
time between January i, 1937 (or his twenty-first birthday if that
came later) and the date on which he reaches 65 or died, whichever
is earlier. 88 In no case can a worker become fully insured unless he has
at least six quarters (three months each) of coverage.4' However, once
he has acquired forty quarters of coverage he is fully insured for life.8 '
As he continues to work in covered employment his benefit, generally
speaking, increases. If he leaves covered employment it decreases.
As for survivors' benefits,8 61 generally speaking, monthly benefits
are payable to the following survivors of fully insured workers: (a)
Unmarried dependent children (natural or adopted, and usually step-
children), who receive monthly payments until they are 18, (b)
Widow, regardless of age, with a child entitled to benefit in her care,
the payments to continue until her youngest child is x8 or until she re-
marries, whichever first occurs, but the payments to begin again when
the widow is 65 and continue until her death; (c) The widow without
a child in her care receives monthly payments when she reaches the
age of 65 if she has not meanwhile remarried; (d) If the deceased
worker leaves neither widow nor child under 18 entitled to monthly
benefits, his parents 65 or over may receive monthly payments if
wholly supported by the wage-earner at the time of Ins death.
If a worker is not fully insured but is "currently insured"-that is,
if he has worked in a covered job roughly half the last three years of
his life, then children under 18 and widows with such children in their
care are entitled to monthly benefits. 82 The widow without young
children nor dependent parents of a worker who died currently insured
cannot receive the monthly payments at 65.113
A lump sum bene]it (one cash payment) is payable in case of either
a fully or currently insured person when he leaves no survivor im-
mediately eligible for monthly payments at the time of is death. Such
payment may go to the widow or widower, child, grandchild, or parent,
"1" 42 U. S. C. A. § 402 (a) (b) (c)
318 Id. § 402, 409 (g)
249 Id. § 402, 409 (g) (1)
330 Id. § 409 (g) (2)
5 "11d. § 402.
252 Id. § 409 (h) ; 402.
$53Id. § 402 (e) (1).
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in the order named.8" If the worker is not survived by any such relative,
the lump sum may be paid to other relatives or friends who pay the
burial expenses.' The monthly retirement benefits payable to the
worker vary from $21 to $56, to the worker and wife from $31.5o to$84.356
The monthly survivor's benefit payments payable to the widow vary
from $15.45 to $42, to the widow and one child, from $25.75 to $70;
to one child or one parent, from $1o.3o to $28.8"
It will not be noted from the foregoing summary that although the
payments provided for survivors are modest and apply only to work-
ers or salaried employees, they do provide benefits which may properly
be taken into account in any estate plan. It should be noted, however,
that the statute thus far does not apply to self-employed persons,"88
although there is legislation pending in Congress to extend social securi-
ty coverage to groups not now covered, including self-employed per-
sons.
5
0
V
BUSINESS INSURANCE
Heretofore discussion has been had of what has been called "Do-
native Insurance," which is the usual type of insurance wherein provi-
sion is made for spouses and dependents or other relatives. When the
individual involved is also the partner or the owner of stock in a closely
held corporation, it is desirable that provision be made whereby the
survivor will be enabled to buy out the interest of the deceased partner
or shareholder if that is otherwise desirable. This can be effected by the
use of life insurance. The matter has been fully analyzed in the writ-
er's discussion of the matter entitled "Problems in Partnership Agree-
ments Coupled with Life Insurance."8 0
In general, the best plan, both for practical and tax reasons, is for
Partner or Shareholder A to take out life insurance on Partner or
Shareholder B and vzce versa in connection with and as part of an
agreement by which the survivor agrees to buy the deceased's interest
a' Id. § 402 (g)
:88 Id. § 402 (g)
850 As per published tables.
a57 As per published tables.
as$ See 42 U. S. C. A. § 409 (b) The Act covers employees with certain excep-
tions; § 1001 (26 U. S. C. A. § 1400), § 1101 (26 U. S. C. A. § 1600)
s H. 2046 (in Committee on Ways and Means)86
ePACIFIC NORTHWEST UNDERWRITER, May, June, 1946.
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in the firm, using insurance proceeds for that purpose. If desired, the
proceeds can be paid to a trustee for disbursement to the deceased's
estate, either in a lump sum or by the use of settlement options in the
policy 18 To effect protection against creditors of the survivor that
might interfere with the buy-and-sell agreement, the policy owner can
assign the policy by way of security to the assured or the trustee for
the assured to secure performance of the survivor's obligation to pur-
chase the interest of the deceased. 86 The agreement should also con-
tain provision permitting the partners or shareholders to buy each
other's interest in the policies in the event of dissolution of the firm
inter vzvos and the deceased's interest in the policy on the survivor
upon the decedent's death. The agreement should also contain a
method or formula for valuing the interest of the deceased.63 If the
policy contains double indemnity provisions, special provision should
be made for the disposition of the proceeds of the double indemnity
features. 6' If one or more of the partners or shareholders are umnsur-
able, special provision should be made for the creation of a fund so
far as possible to purchase the interest of the uninsured partner or
shareholder. The whole problem as to tus plan of business insur-
ance has been elsewhere discussed in detail by the writer and hence
"31 See Re Killien's Estate, 178 Wash. 335, 35 P (2d) II (1934); Proutt's Estate
v. C. I. R., 125 F (2d) 591 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942); 2 RABnx AND JoHNsoN, supra
note 341, at p. 3625, reviews the federal cases. The trustee is merely a conduit,
the proceeds not being available to creditors. If so available the rule is other-
wise. Morton, Adm'r, 23 B. T. A. 236, Dec. 6961 (1931) If partnership owns or
pays for the policies under agreement that the partnership as such is to
purchase the decedent's interest in the business the deceased may be held to
have indirectly paid the premium so as to render the insurance proceeds in-
cludable in his estate for estate tax purposes.
'32 The 1942 Act does not define "incidents of ownership,'. although prior
decisions and the regulations illustrate the meaning of the phrase. Reg. 105,
§ 81.27. From such illustrations it appears that rights of a pledgee are not
included. See analagous case, Pierce Co., Inc. v. Riley, 23 Wn.(2d) 97, 160
P.(2d) 506 (1945)
8Eg., fixing amount now; using book value as of date of death; capitalizing
earnings for designated period or average of annual periods; providing for
appraisement; fixing good will value or providing for the exclusion thereof, etc.
Cf. Spitzer v. C. I, R., 153 F (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 8th, 1946), discussing gift valua-
tion of stock subject to a restrictive agreement. See Gutken and Beck, Restrctive
Stock Agreements and Estate Tax Mint.mtzation (May, 1947) 25 TAXEs-Tin TAx
MAGAzniE.
36, By contract, it may be provided that the life insured shall reimburse the
other partner for that portion of the prenium paid by the other partner which
represents the cost of the double indemnity feature, the proceeds of which go to
the life insured. However, federal estate tax liability may attach as to double
indemnity proceeds under the "payment of premium" test.
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will not be further pursued at tins time. 85
An alternative plan for utilizing business insurance in connection
with a stock acquisition program is one in which the corporation takes
out insurance on the life of an office-stockholder or employee-stock-
holder. At the last legislative session, a corporation was given the
power to purchase its own shares out of its surplus.8 " No provision
was made, however, for giving the corporation an insurable interest
in the life of a shareholder."8 ' In view of the fact, however, that m
closely held corporations the shareholders are also officers or em-
ployees of the corporations involved, and in view of the further fact
that a corporation does have an insurable interest in the life of an
officer or employee,8 the matter is probably not important as long as
the shareholder is also an employee or officer. Before adopting the
corporate business insurance plan (whereby the corporation pays the
premiums rather than the shareholders), consideration should be given
to the following matters:
i. The premium is not deductible for income tax purposes, although
the proceeds are not includable for income tax purposes when the pro-
ceeds are received.889
2. The proceeds are subject to the claims of creditors, and if the
proceeds are taken by them, the business insurance program will be
defeated."' 0
3. Even though the corporation receives the insurance proceeds, then
unless the insurance proceeds have the effect of creating a sufficient
surplus to purchase the share interest of the deceased shareholder the
purchase cannot be effected except to the extent of such surplus." 1
365 Problems sn Partnershlp Agreement, CouLpled With Life Insurance (May
and June, 1946) PACIFIC NORTHWEST UNDERWRITER. See also Simon, Federal Tax
Problems Artstng Upon a Partner's Death (Jan., 1946) 24 TAxEs-TxE TAX IVIAG-
AZINE 50.
886 Wash. Laws 1947, c. 195.
7 Stockholders of close corporations have an insurable interest in the life
of one another. Wash. Laws 1947, c. 79, § 18.03.3(3) That corporation has no
insurable interest in life of a stockholder. See Tate v. Con'l Bldg. Ass'n, 97 Va.
74, 33 S. E. 382, 75 Am. St. Rep. 770, 45 L. R. A. 243 (1899)- 37 C. J. 398-7, § 65.
SOa U. S. v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U. S. 189, 68 L. ed. 970, 44
Sup. Ct. 546 (1924), 37 C. J. 396; Wash. Laws 1947 c. 79, § 18.03.
'
9 INT. REV. CODE §§ 24(a) (4), 22(b) (1), 26 U. S. C. A. § 22(b)1.
370 No exemption from creditors' claims is provided when the life insurance
proceeds are payable to the payor of premiums. Wash. Laws 1947, c. 79, § 18.41.
371 "Surplus" is not defined by Wash. Laws 1947, c. 195. Presumably it is
made up of net assets in excess of the "capital stock" as defined in REm. REv.
STAT. § 3803-1-10.
ESTATE PLANNING
4. The value of the stock interest of the deceased in the corporation
will be augmented by the receipt of the insurance proceeds. This will
increase the tax base for inheritance and estate tax purposes. 2 Furth-
ermore, under the "premium test" or "incidents of ownership test"8 '
upon application of the doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity ' 4
the insurance proceeds may be held includable in the insured's estate.
5. The use of surplus (including insurance proceeds) to purchase
the stock interest of the deceased may be evidence that the surplus is
not reasonably needed in the business and so will operate to subject the
corporation to Section 102 Income Tax-the surtax on undistributed
profits. 7"
Should it be decided that the alternative plan must nevertheless be
used, despite the disadvantages noted, care should be taken to obviate
so far as possible the possibility that the program will not be carried out
-as, for example, by providing for reorgamzmg the corporate struc-
ture so as to create a paid-in surplus if one does not exist in sufficient
amount at the time when the stock purchase is to be effected, ' and by
providing for appropriate protection against contingencies of sale or
corporate dissolution in the stock purchase agreement under which the
corporation agrees to purchase the stock of the deceased employee
stockholder.'"
(To be continued in February, 1948, Issue)
878Assets will be augmented by the difference between the cash surrender
value of the policy immediately before death and the proceeds payable on death.
However, the loss sustained by the corporation through the death of the officer
is an offsetting factor. Newell v. C. I. R., 66 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933)
83 See notes 315-317 supra.
37, Horowitz, Disregarding the Entity of Pnvate Corporations (1940) 15 WASH.
L, REv. 1; Cleary, The Corporate Entity %n Tax Cases (1945) 1 TEx. L. REV. 3;
Mandell, A Tax Guide for Estate Planning (May, 1947) 25 TAXES-TE TAX MAG-
AznE 418.
878 In. REV. CODE § 102, imposes a special surtax on corporations "formed or
availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its
shareholders through the medium of permitting earnings or profits to
accumulate instead of being divided or distributed " The test is permitting
earnings to accumulate "beyond the reasonable needs of the business "
§ 102 (c)
376 Wash. Laws 1947, c. 195, does not require surplus to be "earned surplus."
It may, therefore, be "paid in surplus" created by allocating the stock subscrip-
tion price partly to capital and partly to paid in surplus.
877 See Lacovara, Business Insurance Trusts (1943) 43 COL. L. REV. 328; Maron,
Life Znsurance and Purchase of Its Own Stock by Domestic Corporation (may,
1947) PACIFIC NORTHWEST UNDERWRITER; Wash. Laws 1947, c. 195.
